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Justice Kennedy and the Environment: Property, States' Rights and a Persistent Search for Nexus

Michael C. Blumm
Sherry Bosse

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JUSTICE KENNEDY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PROPERTY, STATES' RIGHTS, AND A PERSISTENT SEARCH FOR NEXUS

Michael C. Blumm* & Sherry L. Bosse**

Abstract: Justice Anthony Kennedy, now clearly the pivot of the Roberts Court, is the Court's crucial voice in environmental law cases. Kennedy's central role was never more evident than in the two most celebrated environmental cases of the last few years, *Kelo v. City of New London* and *Rapanos v. United States*, as he supplied the critical vote in both. Kennedy has in fact been the needle of the Supreme Court's environmental law compass since his nomination in 1988. Although he wrote surprisingly few environmental law opinions over his first eighteen years on the Court, Kennedy was in the majority an astonishing ninety-six percent of the time (as compared to his generic record of being in the majority slightly over sixty percent of the time). This article examines Kennedy's environmental law record on the Court, as well as his preceding thirteen years on the Ninth Circuit. The article evaluates all of the environmental law cases in which he wrote an opinion over those three decades and catalogues his voting record in all Supreme Court cases in which he participated. One striking measure of Kennedy's influence is that he has written just one environmental dissent while on the Court, and that was on states' rights grounds, one of his chief priorities. We believe that Kennedy is considerably more interested in allowing trial judges to resolve cases on the basis of context than in establishing broadly-applicable doctrine. That is, he is a doctrinal minimalist. By consistently demanding a demonstrated "nexus" between doctrine and facts, he has shown an intolerance for elevating abstract philosophy over concrete justice. And, despite his unassailable devotion to states' rights, Kennedy has been quite willing to find federal preemption when it serves deregulation purposes. On the other hand, he is far from an anti-regulatory zealot, although he prefers only one level of governmental regulation. At what might be close to the mid-point in his Court career—and with his power perhaps at its zenith—Justice Kennedy is clearly not someone any litigant can ignore. We hope this article gives both environmental litigants and academics a fertile resource to till. Although Kennedy's environmental record has been sparse until lately, he may be receptive to environmental claims if they are factually well-grounded and do not conflict with his overriding concern for states' rights. The article concludes with some comparisons between Kennedy and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.

* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. This article benefited from the comments of the participants at Lewis and Clark's faculty colloquium and is dedicated to Bill Rodgers, a long-time friend, mentor, and role-model, on the celebration of his forty years of teaching environmental law. Bill has been and will continue to be an inspiration to several generations of law students, lawyers, and law professors.

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INTRODUCTION

That Justice Anthony Kennedy sits at the center of the Roberts Court is hardly a secret.¹ After the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Supreme Court advocates know they must aim their arguments at Kennedy, who seldom finds himself in the minority.² In the

1. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, *Justices Drawn Into Global Warming Debate*, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006 (discussing, presciently, Kennedy's pivotal role in *Massachusetts v. EPA*, ___U.S.___ (April, 2007), 127 S. Ct 1438 (2007), concerning the Environmental Protection Agency's authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act); Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, *Analysis: Kennedy Key To Global Warming Challenge*, <http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/11/26-week> (Nov. 29, 2006, 11:34). After this article was in press, the Supreme Court finished its 2006 term, in which Justice Kennedy was the deciding vote in all twenty-four of the Court's five-member majority decisions. Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, *Justice Kennedy's Remarkable OTO6*, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/06/justice_kennedy_1.html (June 28, 2007, 5:20).

Kennedy was President Reagan's third nominee to replace Justice Lewis Powell, after the Senate rejected Robert Bork and after Douglas Ginsburg withdrew, following revelations that he used marijuana. Kennedy, who had served on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals since his appointment by President Ford in 1975, was confirmed unanimously in February 1988. Kennedy owed his appointment to a longstanding relationship with Ed Meese, Reagan's Chief of Staff and Attorney General. Kennedy graduated from Stanford University in 1958 and Harvard Law School in 1961. He then practiced law in Sacramento, where he also taught constitutional law at McGeorge School of Law and worked with Meese on several projects, including a failed initiative to cut taxes and spending that was supported by Governor Reagan. See Oyez – Anthony Kennedy, http://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony_kennedy/ (last visited June 29, 2007).

Unlike several of his colleagues on the Supreme Court, Kennedy never was a judicial clerk, entering private practice after graduation in San Francisco (1961–63) and Sacramento (1963–75). He taught constitutional law at McGeorge School of Law from 1965 until he was confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice in 1988. See Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, Supreme Court Collection, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/kennedy.bio.html> (last visited June 29, 2007).

A recent assessment of Kennedy's jurisprudence challenged the widespread view that Kennedy is an indecisive justice: "From the beginning, Kennedy's performance on the Court has been defined not by indecision but by self-dramatizing utopianism. He believes it is the role of the Court in general and himself in particular to align the messy reality of American life with an inspiring and highly abstracted set of ideals." Jeffrey Rosen, *Supreme Leader – The Arrogance of Justice Anthony Kennedy*, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 17 (also characterizing Kennedy as "the most activist" current justice, voting "to strike down more state and federal laws combined than any of his colleagues," and labeling his jurisprudence as "a series of moralistic abstractions about liberty, equality, and dignity").

2. Of the eighty environmental decisions Justice Kennedy participated in that we considered in this study, he voted with the majority a remarkable seventy-seven times, or ninety-six percent of the time. See *infra* Appendix A case table. (These statistics include cases in which Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment only, or in which he concurred in part and dissented in part.) Kennedy is a much better barometer of the Court's environmental thinking than he is in all cases: during his first eighteen years on the Court, Kennedy dissented a total of 354 times out of the 874 decisions in which he took part, or 40.5 percent of the time.

Justice Kennedy's record for voting with the majority in close decisions further illustrates his pivotal role at the Court's center: Kennedy voted with the majority in eighty percent of the environmental cases included in this survey that were decided with a 5-4 vote. Of the eighty cases in this survey, fifteen rested on majority opinions joined by just five members of the Court. See *infra* Appendix A case table. Kennedy voted with the dissent in just three of these decisions. See *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed *infra* notes 187–203 and accompanying text; *Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.*, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), discussed *infra* notes 48–50

environmental field (which we define to include natural resources and land use law), Justice Kennedy's pivotal role was cemented by his recent opinions in the *Kelo v. City of New London*³ and *Rapanos v. United States*⁴ cases, where he cast the deciding votes.⁵ While Kennedy's role in those cases has received quite a bit of commentary,⁶ there is no

and accompanying text; and *Idaho v. United States*, 533 U.S. 262 (2001), discussed *infra* note 100. Two additional decisions rested on Justice Kennedy's decision to provide the crucial fifth vote in the judgment only, but to write a separate concurrence in each case. See *E. Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), discussed *infra* notes 101–106 and accompanying text; *Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, ___U.S.___ (June, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006), discussed *infra* notes 240–254 and accompanying text. In another case, *Borden Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs.*, 537 U.S. 99 (2002), an equally divided Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit's decision after Justice Kennedy removed himself from the case.

By the end of the first term for the Roberts Court, several commentators had recognized Kennedy's newly pivotal role, alone, at the Court's center. See Dahlia Lithwick, *A Supreme Court of One*, WASH. POST, Jul. 2, 2006, at B1 (discussing Kennedy's emergence as the swing vote on the Roberts Court and the controlling effect of his opinion in *Rapanos*); Linda Greenhouse, *Roberts Is at Court's Helm, But He Isn't Yet in Control*, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2006, at A1 (placing Kennedy both literally and figuratively at Court's center for the regularity in which he cast the deciding vote in split decisions in the Roberts Court's first term).

3. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

4. ___U.S.___ (June, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).

5. See *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 484 (joining the opinion Justice Stevens wrote for the 5-4 majority upholding a city's decision to use its eminent domain power to condemn developed land for an economic development project because it fulfilled the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment); *infra* notes 234–237 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's *Kelo* concurrence); *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (providing the critical fifth vote for the majority when he concurred in the judgment). Kennedy refused to join Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in *Rapanos*, instead writing a separate concurrence that has more in common with Justice Stevens's dissent than with Scalia's opinion. See *infra* notes 247–254 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence).

6. See Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, *From Public Use to Public Purpose: The Supreme Court Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London*, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 81, 98 (2005) (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurrence in *Kelo* and the public use doctrine); Orlando E. Delogu, *Kelo v. City of New London—Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for Principled Line Drawing with Respect to Eminent Domain Takings*, 58 ME. L. REV. 18, 42–46 (2006) (advocating the more stringent standard of review for eminent domain in economic revitalization projects that Justice Kennedy's *Kelo* concurrence suggested). *Kelo* prompted a vocal and widespread backlash, discussed *infra* note 227.

Justice Kennedy's concurrence in *Rapanos* generated a considerable amount of commentary in the press. See Linda Greenhouse, *Justices Divided on Protections Over Wetlands*, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 20, 2006, at A1 (suggesting Kennedy's "significant nexus" may be the standard the Army Corps of Engineers adopts if it undertakes rulemaking to define its wetlands jurisdiction); Warren Richey, *High Court Splits Over Protecting Wetlands*, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 20, 2006, at USA 1 (discussing how Justice Kennedy's interpretation of "significant nexus" will allow for a greater degree of Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands than Scalia advocated in *Rapanos*); Charlie Tebbutt, Op-Ed, *Ruling Befouls Clean Water Efforts*, EUGENE REGISTER-GUARD, Aug. 20, 2006, at F1 (discussing the *Rapanos* decision and criticizing Kennedy's opinion for "mudd[y]ing" the waters" of wetlands jurisdiction); David G. Savage, *Déjà Vu Once Again: Despite New Faces on the Supreme Court, Term's Ending Is Familiar*, A.B.A. J. Sept. 2006, at 12 (discussing how Justice Kennedy's seat alone at the Court's center made his vote the deciding factor in a number of prominent decisions, including *Rapanos*, during the Roberts Court's first term); *DOJ Plan for Dual Wetlands*

systematic assessment of his entire environmental record.⁷ In this article, we aim to provide that assessment by evaluating all of Justice Kennedy's environmental opinions, including those he wrote during the thirteen years he served on the Ninth Circuit before his 1988 appointment to the Supreme Court.⁸

One remarkable aspect of the Kennedy environmental law record is just how little there is of it. In a judicial career spanning more than three decades, Justice Kennedy has written only twenty-one opinions that can be characterized as within our broad definition of environmental law: twelve majority opinions, eight concurrences, and just one dissent.⁹ Although Justice Kennedy has been an active participant in the Supreme Court's decisions concerning alleged regulatory takings of property,¹⁰

Jurisdiction Test Wins Cautious Backing, 15 WATER POLICY REP., no. 16, Aug. 7, 2006 (discussing the U.S. Department of Justice's decision to use either Justice Kennedy's or Justice Scalia's tests to determine wetlands jurisdiction post-*Rapanos*); William W. Buzbee, *Interpreting the Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in the Joint Cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs.*, Testimony Before the Committee on Senate Environment & Public Works Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, Aug. 1, 2006 (transcript available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/109th/Buzbee_Testimony.pdf) (describing Justice Kennedy's opinion as the "key" to the Court's ruling in *Rapanos*).

7. Richard Lazarus has, however, supplied a (now somewhat dated) assessment of the Supreme Court's environmental record as a whole. Richard J. Lazarus, *Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court*, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 812 (2000) (rating Justice Kennedy's environmental record as 25.9 percent, prior to 1998) [hereinafter Lazarus, *Environmental Law in the Supreme Court*]. See also Richard J. Lazarus, *Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later*, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 673 (2002). Lazarus's analytical data has been more recently updated by Jonathan Cannon, in his cultural analysis of the Supreme Court's environmental opinions. In that study, according to Cannon, Justice Kennedy raised his environmental record to 34.1 percent. Jonathan Cannon, *Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis*, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 363, 441 (2006) (updating the environmental scores for the justices sitting on the current Court with data from recent environmental opinions as part of a cultural analysis of the Supreme Court's environmental opinions).

8. See *supra* note 1.

9. Justice Kennedy has voted on many more decisions than these, but we believe those cases in which he wrote opinions are the best reflections of his judicial disposition. At any rate, analyzing his opinions is much more telling than guessing at his silences. In *Eastern Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998), Kennedy concurred in part, dissented in part. See *infra* notes 101–106 and accompanying text. This article counts that decision as a concurrence.

10. See *Kelo*, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing for heightened scrutiny for the use of eminent domain when the public use at issue is economic development); *Lingle v. Chevron*, 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining Justice O'Connor's majority opinion repudiating the court's use of the substantive due process "substantially advances" test in takings cases, but writing separately to highlight the possibility that some regulations "might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process"); *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (holding that the fact that a landowner acquired his property after enactment of the challenged regulations did not automatically bar the landowner's regulatory takings claim if a previous owner could not take the steps to make the claim ripe, although this result was tempered by the conclusion the landowner had not been deprived of all economic value of his property); *City of Monterey v.*

aside from those cases, he has not seemed very invested in environmental issues, at least when they involve statutory interpretation.¹¹ Kennedy perhaps broke this apparent disinterest in his decisive concurrence in *Rapanos*, where he refused to restrict federal jurisdiction over wetlands to relatively permanent or continuously flowing bodies of water, instead opting to uphold federal jurisdiction wherever there was “a significant nexus” between a wetland and a navigable water.¹²

Even if Justice Kennedy’s *Rapanos* opinion does not signal a change in his interest in environmental issues, he remains the indispensable vote on the Court. Richard Lazarus has pointed out that Kennedy has an “astounding record” for being in the majority in environmental cases.¹³ Even when he does not write an opinion, Kennedy is often the pivotal environmental vote. For example, in the Court’s recent decision granting standing to a coalition of states challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s refusal to regulate carbon emission under the Clean Air Act, it was a Kennedy suggestion at oral argument that supplied the reasoning adopted by Justice Stevens’s majority opinion.¹⁴ Of the eighty Supreme Court environmental opinions considered for the purposes of this article, Justice Kennedy was in the majority an astonishing seventy-seven times, or ninety-six percent of the time.¹⁵ Advocates in

Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999) (approving the use of jury determinations in a regulatory takings case); *Apfel*, 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (refusing to apply takings analysis to retroactive legislation); *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n*, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing for a standard based on a landowner’s reasonable expectations, which would also take into account environmental factors); *see also infra* notes 296–313 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy’s role in the Court’s decisions in takings cases).

Eastern and *Lingle* both involved takings claims that did not occur in the context of land use decisions. *Eastern* addressed the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, 524 U.S. 498, discussed *infra* notes 101–106, while *Lingle* involved an oil company challenge to whether a Hawaii statute limiting rent oil companies could charge service stations, 544 U.S. 528, discussed *infra* notes 215–226. While not strictly environmental, both cases were included in this study because takings cases have such a profound impact on environmental law.

11. Our colleague, Craig Johnston, Professor of Law at Lewis and Clark Law School, pointed this fact out to us.

12. *Rapanos v. United States*, __U.S.__ (June, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

13. Lazarus, *Environmental Law in the Supreme Court*, *supra* note 7, at 714 (noting that Kennedy was in the majority in 56 of 57 cases decided between 1988 and 2000).

14. *Massachusetts v. EPA*, __U.S.__ (Apr. 2007), 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) *see infra* note 74 and accompanying text.

15. *See infra* Appendix A (displaying tabular data of the Court’s environmental decisions during Kennedy’s tenure). We are indebted to Richard Lazarus, whose methodology in selecting cases for his analysis of the Court’s environmental opinions influenced our methodology for selecting the

environmental cases must tailor their arguments to win his vote or risk losing their appeals. There is thus much to be gained by carefully examining the Kennedy environmental record, for it may very well portend the future of environmental law in the Roberts Court.¹⁶

This article maintains that Kennedy is best characterized as a contextualist, attached to case-by-case fact-finding that links context to legal standards. His devotion to a nexus between facts and rules, especially evident in his standing opinions,¹⁷ also dominated his recent

cases used in this study of Justice Kennedy's environmental opinions. See Lazarus, *Environmental Law in the Supreme Court*, *supra* note 7, at 708 (explaining the reasoning behind selecting cases to include in his study of the Court's environmental opinions). We employed similar criteria to select additional cases in which the environment or natural resources are at stake in the decision, including boundary disputes between states and cases involving areas of the law with a fundamental effect on jurisdictional issues in federal environmental laws, such as the Eleventh Amendment, Fifth Amendment takings, and Commerce Clause authority.

16. At the beginning of the second term for the Roberts Court, a large number of commentators perceived Justice Kennedy as the most influential vote on the Court in a variety of areas, including the environment. See Editorial: *The Kennedy Court? One Man with Caprice Makes a Majority*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2006, at A6 (noting the disproportionate attention being paid to Justice Kennedy at the start of the Court's 2006 term as a symptom of his newfound prominence alone at the Court's center); Warren Richey, *Will the Supreme Court Shackle New Tribunal Law?*, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 17, 2006, at USA1 (discussing Justice Kennedy's emerging role as the crucial vote in national security cases, as well as in decisions involving a number of other "hot-button social issues"); Warren Richey, *For Supreme Court's New Term: Rise of a New Centrist*, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2006, at USA2 (speculating on how Kennedy's newly prominent role at the Court's center may influence a number of key decisions during the 2006-07 term); Gregory Stanford, *A High Court Tilts and Your Rights Get Squashed*, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jul. 30, 2006, at J4 (describing Justice Kennedy's centrist stance as the "saving grace" of the Roberts Court's first term); *Morning Edition: A Newly Conservative Supreme Court?* (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 2, 2006) (identifying social issues on which Kennedy assumes a more conservative stance than Justice O'Connor's centrist views); Bill Mears, *Justice Kennedy Works on His Swing*, CNN, Sept. 29, 2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/25/scotus.kennedy/index.html> (discussing Justice Kennedy's pivotal role as the Court's "man in the middle" in several divisive social issues).

17. Justice Kennedy, writing for a five member majority in *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, upheld a district court decision to submit a takings claim to a jury but rejected the more stringent "rough proportionality" test as a means of evaluating takings claims that do not involve exactions for the purpose of dedicating private property to public use. 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999), discussed *infra* notes 107-123. In his concurrence in *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env'tl. Serv., Inc.*, Justice Kennedy stood alone in suggesting that citizen suit provisions may interfere with powers conferred on the Executive branch by Article II of the constitution. 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring), discussed *infra* notes 159-160. Nearly a decade earlier, Kennedy disagreed with Justice Scalia's rejection of environmental plaintiff standing based on an "animal or vocational nexus" in *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, and instead wrote a separate concurrence expressing his willingness to consider standing on that basis, should the Court be presented with different facts. See 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring), discussed *infra* notes 69-77. However, later in his *Lujan* concurrence, Kennedy appeared to question the validity of standing under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act for its failure to "establish that there is an injury in 'any person' by virtue of any 'violation'" of the statute. See *id.* at

interpretation of the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.¹⁸ Kennedy is also committed to states' rights. He was part of the Rehnquist Court majority that created the first limits on the federal commerce power in sixty years,¹⁹ and that announced significant state immunity from federal court suits in the Eleventh Amendment.²⁰ And as

580. As a member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Kennedy wrote an opinion holding that a plaintiff lacked standing in a Clean Water Act citizen suit. According to Kennedy, the injury was not redressable by injunctive relief since the underlying purpose of the CWA citizen suit provision—protecting clean water and the environment—was not served by the suit. *Gonzales v. Gorsuch*, 688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), discussed *infra* notes 33–35.

18. See *Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs.*, ___U.S.___ (June, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (writing separately to advocate requiring a "significant nexus" between a wetland and navigable waters to establish CWA jurisdiction over a wetland); see *infra* notes 247–254.

19. See *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the Rehnquist majority invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act, a federal law prohibiting firearms within 1000 feet of schools, because it overstepped the congressional Commerce Clause power, and writing a separate concurrence to emphasize how the connection with interstate commerce was too attenuated to justify federal interference with state police powers); Lawrence Lessig, *Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez*, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131 (1995) (linking the Court's backpedaling from New Deal-era interpretations of expansive Commerce Clause powers and its decision placing limits on federal power in *Lopez* with earlier movements to federal power); Robert F. Nagel, *The Future of Federalism*, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 644–47 (1996) (discussing the analytic approach the Court took in *Lopez* and its implications in other contexts); Donald H. Regan, *How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez*, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 565–67 (1995) (discussing Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the federal power to use the Commerce Clause to regulate non-commercial activity in his concurrence in *Lopez*); Bradley A. Harsch, *Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce Clause Canard: A Synthesis of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence*, 29 N.M. L. REV. 321, 326–328 (1999) (criticizing *Lopez* as an under-inclusive test for Commerce Clause legislation).

20. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Rehnquist Court issued a series of opinions interpreting the Eleventh Amendment to shield states from suits in a number of federal laws. In *Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida*, a slim five-member majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas held that Congress could not use the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). See Erwin Chemerinsky, *The Assumptions of Federalism*, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1774 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions expanding state sovereign immunity); Robert L. Glicksman, *From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy*, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 764–65 (2006) (characterizing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions as the source of the "most aggressive limitations" on federal legislative power in recent decades); David Milton Whalin, *John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice: State Sovereignty, Judicial Review, and Environmental Law After June 23, 1999*, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. J. 193, 194–95 (2000) (comparing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment revolution with the "nullification doctrine," which asserted that states could nullify acts of Congress, a theory promoted most prominently by John C. Calhoun, the slavery defender from South Carolina).

Justice Kennedy's prominence in this line of cases is demonstrated by his authorship of two subsequent opinions for the same five-member majority expounding on Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity. In *Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho*, Justice Kennedy held that the state of Idaho was shielded from the tribe's suit by the Eleventh Amendment. 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997),

a professed property rights defender, Kennedy is a government planning skeptic.²¹ These doctrinal minimalist, states' rights, and property rights sentiments do not always point in the same direction, making Kennedy's jurisprudence especially interesting to examine.

This analysis of the Kennedy record on the environment is in chronological order, beginning with Kennedy's tenure on the Ninth Circuit, proceeding to his Supreme Court opinions prior to 2000, then examining his post-2000 decisions through 2004, and finally assessing his pivotal role in the environmental decisions of 2005–06. Section I begins by discussing Judge Kennedy's Ninth Circuit environmental opinions, of which there are only a few. Section II turns to Kennedy's early years on the Supreme Court, from 1988 to 2000, including several important decisions on standing, takings, and preemption. Section III evaluates Kennedy's opinions during 2000–04, highlighted by an important majority opinion on takings and Kennedy's sole written environmental dissent. Section IV examines the decisions of 2005–06, focusing on the *Kelo*, *Rapanos*, and *Lingle v. Chevron*²² decisions.²³ In section V, the article profiles Kennedy's contributions to discrete areas of the law, including standing and ripeness, federalism, takings, and statutory interpretation of environmental laws. The article concludes that Kennedy is best characterized as a doctrinal minimalist, who is attached to case-by-case fact-finding and to requiring fact-finders to show a “nexus” between rules and context;²⁴ a states' rights advocate;²⁵ and a

discussed infra notes 87–100. Kennedy wrote for another five-member majority two years later in *Alden v. Maine*, affirming a lower court dismissal of a suit that had been filed by probation officers against their employer, the state of Maine, alleging that the state had violated the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, on the grounds the suit was barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).

The same five-member majority banded together yet again in *Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett*, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded a state from lawsuits under a federal law, this time preventing former employees of the state of Alabama from recovering damages from the state for its failure to comply with Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). The five-member majority finally broke apart in the Court's 2003 decision in *Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs*, when Chief Justice Rehnquist held that a state employee's suit against the state for its failure to comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because Congress had enacted the legislation using its Fourteenth Amendment power to ameliorate past discrimination. Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the opinion, and Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas dissented. 538 U.S. 721, 726, 744 (2003).

21. *See infra* note 26.

22. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).

23. On *Kelo* and *Rapanos*, *see supra* notes 5–6, *infra* notes 227–237, 244–254 and accompanying text; on *Lingle*, *see infra* notes 215–226 and accompanying text.

24. *Webster's* defines “nexus” as “a connection, interconnection tie, link; a connected group or series; a predicative relation or a construction consisting of grammatical elements either actually or

property rights defender, who is quite skeptical of government planning.²⁶

I. JUDGE KENNEDY ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Judge Kennedy's environmental record on the Ninth Circuit is sparse. Appointed by President Ford in 1975, in more than a dozen years, Kennedy wrote only four environmental opinions. These decisions show Kennedy to be a relatively non-doctrinaire jurist, open to considering environmental claims but hardly welcoming them.

Kennedy's first environmental opinion came in a 1980 decision that overturned a lower court's rejection of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) challenge by a citizens' group to the Federal Highway Administration's funding of a four-lane expansion on Highway 2, outside of Glacier National Park in Montana.²⁷ The lower court ruled that the environmentalists' suit was barred by laches. However, a panel led by Judge Kennedy reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs had not actually delayed bringing suit for a decade because the project had been expanded and final federal approval came some nine years after it was first proposed in 1969.²⁸ On the merits, Judge Kennedy concluded that the government's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the project was deficient because it failed to analyze the secondary effects of the highway, and because it did not include an adequate range of alternatives, such as improving the existing two-lane highway.²⁹

Two years later, in another NEPA suit, Judge Kennedy affirmed a lower court in a panel decision upholding a Department of Housing and Urban Development determination not to prepare an EIS on a

felt as so related." WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY 1524 (1986). For a discussion of the "nexus" requirement in the context of standing, see Cass R. Sunstein, *What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III*, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 201 (1992) (noting that Justice Kennedy indicated in *Lujan* that he might be willing to recognize standing based on some "nexus" theory); Cass R. Sunstein, *Standing and the Privatization of Public Law*, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1452-58 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of a "nexus" requirement to restrict standing).

25. See *Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed *infra* notes 187-203 and accompanying text.

26. See Robert A. Chaim, *Justice Kennedy Inaugurates the Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture Series*, MCGEORGE MAG., 1991, at 10-11 (quoting Kennedy as remarking that "property provides the structural vehicle through which we can protect ourselves against a blueprint for the future being imposed by government . . . ever hungry for self-aggrandizement").

27. *Coalition for Canyon Pres. v. Bowers*, 632 F.2d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1980).

28. *Id.* at 780-81.

29. *Id.* at 784.

redevelopment plan that would displace local artists in San Francisco.³⁰ The plaintiffs alleged that displacing local artists would “irreparably damage the cultural character of the area,” but Judge Kennedy rejected the notion that a significant effect on the cultural environment triggered an EIS. Judge Kennedy also noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a “causal nexus” between the redevelopment and any significant cultural impact, the first of many Kennedy opinions demanding “nexus.”³¹ This demand for the development of specific facts sufficient to show a close fit between the conflict at issue and the purpose of the environmental law would become characteristic of Kennedy’s environmental jurisprudence, culminating in his 2006 *Rapanos* opinion.³²

Another 1982 panel opinion written by Judge Kennedy affirmed a lower court’s rejection of a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency’s funding a wastewater treatment facility for purposes allegedly unrelated to water pollution.³³ Unlike the lower court, which ruled that the Clean Water Act authorized the expenditures, Judge Kennedy concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing because by the time the suit was filed, the local government grantee had already spent the money, and there was no guarantee of future funds.³⁴ Thus, injunctive relief would not redress the alleged injury, and the purpose of the statute’s citizen suit provision—to protect clean water and the environment—could not be served by the plaintiff’s suit.³⁵

In still another 1982 panel opinion, Judge Kennedy upheld an Oregon district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction preventing the Yakama Tribe from harvesting Columbia River salmon. The State of Washington sought the injunction in response to extremely low salmon counts at Bonneville Dam in the spring of 1980.³⁶ The tribe appealed the

30. *Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom*, 679 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1982).

31. *Id.* at 184.

32. *See infra* notes 246–254 and accompanying text.

33. *Gonzales v. Gorsuch*, 688 F.2d 1263, 1264–1265 (9th Cir. 1982). This decision drew a concurrence from Judge Wallace, who emphasized the distinction between constitutional and prudential standing, maintaining that the Clean Water Act’s citizen suit provision eliminated prudential standing barriers and gave standing to anyone who could meet Article III standing requirements. *Id.* at 1269 (Wallace, J., concurring).

34. *Id.* at 1267 (“[N]othing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to ignore or to test the conventional requisites of justiciability.”).

35. *Id.* at 1266, 1268 (stating that “[the CWA’s] grant of standing does not extend to a review of appropriations where the review and any judicial decree would be ineffective to vindicate environmental concerns”).

36. *United States v. Oregon*, 657 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1982). The 1980 injunction and the

injunction, which involved fisheries located on or near the Yakama Reservation, on the ground that the lower court's fishing closure extinguished the tribe's treaty fishing rights without protecting the salmon.³⁷ Although the 1980 spring chinook salmon run was over, the Ninth Circuit panel ruled that the tribe's claim was not moot because, in light of the ongoing nature of litigation over Indian treaty fishing rights, the tribe had a "reasonable expectation" it could face a similar injunction in the future.³⁸ Further, the sovereign immunity and jurisdictional issues the tribe raised were also likely to recur in the case.³⁹

Reaching the merits, Judge Kennedy rejected the tribe's sovereign immunity defense, concluding that the tribe had waived its immunity when it intervened in the original suit.⁴⁰ He also rejected the tribe's argument that the injunction against tribal fishing on reservation lands violated its treaty rights.⁴¹ Kennedy reasoned that if states have the ability to regulate treaty fishing to further conservation interests without violating treaty rights, a federal court should have the same ability to do so.⁴² This deferential treatment of the State's position in this case was hardly surprising for a states' rights advocate.

Judge Kennedy's few environmental decisions on the Ninth Circuit were not those of an ideological jurist. He was not noticeably hostile to environmental claims, although he was hardly an enthusiast. He produced remarkably few environmental opinions during a dozen years on the court, a harbinger of his early years on the Supreme Court.

ensuing litigation grew out of a suit filed by individual members of the Yakama Tribe in 1968 to protect treaty fishing rights for Columbia Basin tribes, in which the tribe later intervened. *Sohappy v. Smith*, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). The Yakama Tribe changed the spelling of its name from "Yakima" in 1993, in order to reflect its historic spelling.

37. *Oregon*, 657 F.2d at 1012.

38. *Id.* at 1012, n.7.

39. *Id.* at 1012.

40. *Id.* at 1014. In addition to intervening in the original suit, the tribe had entered into an agreement with the State of Washington in 1977, in which both the tribe and the state consented to resolve any disputes over Columbia River salmon management in Oregon district court. *Id.*

41. *Id.* at 1016 (ruling that federal courts with jurisdiction have authority to regulate both on- and off-reservation fishing in the interest of conservation).

42. *Id.* at 1016. Kennedy referred to the right to harvest salmon as the "res" of the treaty, concluding that "[s]ince the existence of the salmon was inextricably linked to the res in the court's constructive custody, the court was empowered to enjoin interference with that custody." *Id.* at 1015-16.

II. EARLY YEARS ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1988–2000

Justice Kennedy's first dozen years on the Supreme Court were marked first by acquiescence to the opinions of his colleagues, then by two significant concurrences that revealed Kennedy to possess a significantly different approach to environmental issues than, for example, Justice Scalia.⁴³ He also displayed a surprising willingness to preempt state statutes to avoid perceived overregulation,⁴⁴ as well as a nuanced approach to landowner claims for compensation to remedy alleged regulatory takings.⁴⁵

Any significance in Justice Kennedy's role in environmental decisions during his first four years on the Court must be deciphered from his silence between 1988 and 1991. In all but one of the thirteen environmental decisions in which he took part during those four years⁴⁶ Justice Kennedy joined the majority without writing an opinion.⁴⁷ That

43. See *infra* notes 53–65 (discussing *Lucas v. S.C. Comm'n*), 66–77 (discussing *Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan*) and accompanying text.

44. See *infra* note 80 and accompanying text (discussing *Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n*, 505 U.S. 88 (1992)).

45. See *infra* notes 101–123 and accompanying text (discussing *E. Enters. v. Apfel* and *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*).

46. Justice Kennedy did not take part in several environmental decisions issued by the Court shortly after his confirmation. These included the Court's decision that states acquired title to lands within their borders that were submerged beneath tidal waters not navigable-in-fact when they joined the union, *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss.*, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988), and the Court's holding that the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment did not prohibit the United States Forest Service from approving a timber sale in Northern California on federal public lands that included sites sacred to the religions of several Native American tribes. *Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n*, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).

47. See *Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation*, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (opinion by Justice White holding that the Yakama Tribe did not have authority to regulate non-tribal lands within its reservation boundaries); *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (opinion by Justice Stevens for a unanimous court holding that NEPA did not require a fully-developed mitigation plan or a worst-case scenario analysis in an environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared by the Forest Service analyzing a proposed alpine ski resort development in Washington state); *Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council*, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (opinion by Justice Stevens for a unanimous court, in a companion case to *Methow Valley Citizens Council*, holding that the Army Corps of Engineers complied with NEPA in the EIS on the Elk Creek Dam in Oregon's Rogue River Basin because a worst-case analysis was not required in the EIS, nor was a fully-developed mitigation plan; moreover, the Corps' decision not to supplement the EIS was within its discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious); *Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico*, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (opinion by Justice Stevens holding that a non-Indian corporation leasing Jicarilla Apache tribal lands for oil and gas production could be taxed by the state, as well as by the tribe, for the same activity); *Hallstrom v. Tillamook County*, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (opinion by Justice O'Connor dismissing a citizen suit filed by a dairy farmer against the operator of a landfill on property adjacent to the farm for failing to meet the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because the farmer failed to comply with the law's sixty-

exception was the Court's decision in *Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.*,⁴⁸ where Justice Kennedy joined both Justice White's dissent, which denied that Congress intended to waive state sovereign immunity in the 1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,⁴⁹ and Justice Scalia's dissent, which denied that Congress had the power to waive the states' Eleventh Amendment-protected immunity even if it intended to do so.⁵⁰ Kennedy's decision to join Scalia's dissent foreshadowed the overturning of the majority opinion in *Union Gas* just six years later in

day notice requirement for citizen suits); *New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans*, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (opinion by Justice Scalia holding that a federal district court improperly abstained from exercising its jurisdiction when it characterized a suit filed by a utility against a local government for its failure to fully reimburse the utility for plant construction costs as a complex state regulatory matter under exclusive jurisdiction of the state); *Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States*, 496 U.S. 30 (1990) (opinion by Justice Blackmun for a unanimous court holding that EPA's failure to approve a revised state implementation plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act within the four-month statutory deadline did not prevent the agency from enforcing the existing SIP); *California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n*, 495 U.S. 490 (1990) (opinion by Justice O'Connor for a unanimous court holding that the Federal Power Act preempted state minimum instream flow requirements for the Rock Creek hydroelectric project); *Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n*, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (opinion by Justice Scalia holding that an environmental group's challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's "land withdrawal review program" for violating both the National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act failed because affidavits by the organization's members claiming that they used lands "in the vicinity" of the lands affected by the challenged decisions were insufficient to establish standing); *Wis. Pub. Intervener v. Mortier*, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (opinion by Justice White holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt local government regulation of pesticide use when those regulations did not conflict with federal regulations); *Illinois v. Kentucky*, 500 U.S. 380 (1991) (opinion by Justice Souter settling a boundary dispute between the two states by declaring the boundary lies at the low water mark of the Ohio River as it existed in 1792).

In the final case from this era, *Oklahoma v. New Mexico*, Justice Kennedy joined all but one part of Justice White's majority opinion resolving a dispute over New Mexico's diversion of additional water from the Canadian River, which had been apportioned between it and Oklahoma and Texas by an interstate compact. 501 U.S. 221, 242 (1991). Kennedy also joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part on the grounds that the Court's interpretation of the Canadian River Compact, which gave New Mexico unrestricted use of waters originating above the Conchas Dam but restricted its use below, was erroneous in that it considered water spilled over the dam not to have originated above the dam, and thus was subject to the Compact's use restrictions to ensure sufficient flows reach the downstream states. *Id.* at 244–45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

48. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).

49. *Id.* at 28 (White, J., concurring).

50. *Id.* at 57 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor also joined this opinion. Kennedy's decision to join even a partial dissent in an environmental decision is notable because it has been an infrequent occurrence during his tenure on the Court. See *supra* note 2 (discussing his remarkable record for voting with the majority in environmental decisions).

Seminole Tribe v. Florida,⁵¹ the first in a series of opinions expanding state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.⁵²

It was not until five years after Kennedy joined the court that he wrote an opinion in an environmental case.

A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

In 1992, Justice Kennedy broke his silence on the environment. In *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council*,⁵³ he wrote a concurrence to Justice Scalia's majority opinion ruling that the constitution required that landowners receive compensation, subject to several exceptions, for regulations that produced complete losses of economic value.⁵⁴ Kennedy's concurrence was quite revealing, for it indicated that a significant divide separated him from Justice Scalia.⁵⁵ Although he

51. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in *Seminole Tribe* was joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia, all of whom joined Justice Scalia's *Union Gas* dissent. *Id.* at 66. The key fifth vote in *Seminole Tribe* came from Justice Clarence Thomas, who was appointed to the court two years after *Union Gas* by George H.W. Bush in 1991. Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, Supreme Court Collection, at <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/thomas.bio.html> (last visited June 29, 2007).

52. See *supra* note 20 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment revolution, expanding the scope of state sovereign immunity).

53. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

54. See *id.* at 1032–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally Carol M. Rose, *The Story of Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea*, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 278 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, eds. 2005) (thoroughly discussing the context and significance of the case, the latter of which Rose considered to be a prime example of “imbalanced propertization”). In what must be one of the prime examples of the law of unintended consequences, the *Lucas* exceptions have proved much more significant and enduring than the categorical takings rule the decision established. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, *Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses*, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 329 (2005).

55. See Richard J. Lazarus, *The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the Property Rights Movement within the Supreme Court*, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 801–03 (2006) (noting Kennedy chose a “very different analytic framework” to evaluate regulatory takings in his concurrence in *Lucas* from that advocated by Justice Scalia); Glenn P. Sugameli, *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule”*, 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 943–45 (1999) (discussing the “very different views” Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia expressed toward regulatory takings in *Lucas*); F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, *Lucas*, and *Penn Central*: *The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing*, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 487–89 (2001) (discussing the divide between the Scalia and Kennedy view of a property owner's reasonable expectations); Peter C. Meier, *Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach: Taking Takings Into the Post-Lucas Era*, 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 413, 444 (1995) (arguing that courts should adopt Justice Kennedy's approach to defining total takings over that advocated by Justice Scalia in order to allow for a “broader understanding of regulatory power”).

joined a six-member majority in *Lucas*,⁵⁶ Kennedy's concurrence emphasized his disagreement with Scalia concerning the scope of the exemptions from the *Lucas* compensation rule.⁵⁷ According to Kennedy, Scalia's exemption from compensation for regulations preventing activities that would amount to common law nuisances⁵⁸ was too narrow because the basic test for compensation for regulatory takings was "whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations."⁵⁹ Justice Kennedy's view was that because "courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever the source," the "common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of a regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society."⁶⁰ He would therefore not subject all new regulatory initiatives to compensation requirements where they produced economic wipeouts because changed conditions and new ecological understandings might justify them. For example, coastal property "may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit."⁶¹

Justice Kennedy's *Lucas* concurrence was a clear signal that he was not persuaded by Justice Scalia's effort to advance landowner rights in a single judicial decree.⁶² Instead, Kennedy showed himself to be a judicial conservative—a doctrinal minimalist⁶³ with an affinity for fact-

56. Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. The Court reversed a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court that had upheld the state's defense to a landowner's takings claim on the ground that the state Beachfront Management Act—which prohibited construction of dwellings on the landowner's barrier island property (rendering his lots "valueless," according to a trial court stipulation)—was a legitimate use of the police power and insulated from constitutional compensation by the so-called "nuisance exception" to the takings clause because the state was preventing a public harm. *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council*, 404 S.E. 2d 895, 901–02 (S.C. 1991).

57. *Lucas*, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).

58. *Id.* at 1031.

59. *Id.* at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Where a taking is alleged from regulation which deprives the property of all value, the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.").

60. *Id.* at 1035 ("In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of our legal tradition.").

61. *Id.* at 1035 ("[The] Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law."). Lower courts have not restricted the nuisance defense to common law nuisances. See Blumm & Ritchie, *supra* note 54, at 335.

62. See Lazarus, *supra* note 55, at 787–88 (discussing Justice Scalia's efforts on the Court to promote a property rights agenda).

63. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, *Leaving Things Undecided*, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (discussing trends in invoking minimalism on the Supreme Court).

specific determinations.⁶⁴ Kennedy's *Lucas* concurrence revealed him to be not philosophically opposed to regulation if the need for it was evident from the record. His mention of "fragile land[s]" as justifying regulation indicated that, for Kennedy, context was a key factor.⁶⁵

B. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

Another well-known 1992 case prompted another Kennedy concurrence. In *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*,⁶⁶ a six-member majority of the Court ruled that environmentalists lacked standing to challenge a Department of the Interior regulation exempting federal agencies acting in foreign countries from the obligation to engage in Endangered Species Act (ESA) consultation before undertaking proposals that could threaten species listed under the statute.⁶⁷ Justice Scalia again wrote for the majority, conceding that "the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, was undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing," but concluding that the environmentalists suffered no "imminent injury," since past visits to the species' habitats "prove nothing," and a mere intent to return in the future "without any description of concrete plans" for doing so was insufficient to create standing.⁶⁸

Justice Kennedy concurred in most of the six-member majority opinion,⁶⁹ but he objected to Justice Scalia's categorical rejection that

64. See *supra* notes 30–32 (rejecting an argument that a project with significant effects on the cultural environment required an EIS absent any "causal nexus" between the project and any significant cultural impact while sitting on the Ninth Circuit in *Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom*, 679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1982); *infra* note 87 (ruling that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, invalidated by *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), was beyond the scope of congressional Commerce Clause authority because it lacked a "commercial nexus").

65. See *Lucas*, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

66. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

67. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The environmental plaintiffs challenged the application of this exemption to several federally-funded projects abroad, including U.S. involvement in rebuilding the Aswan High Dam on the Nile in Egypt and construction of the Mahaweli Dam in Sri Lanka, funded by the Agency for International Development. *Id.* at 563. A district court initially dismissed the suit on the grounds that the environmental plaintiffs lacked standing, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court issued a judgment in favor of the environmentalists, both on the standing issue and on the merits, which the Eighth Circuit upheld. *Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan*, 911 F.2d 117, 118 (8th Cir. 1990). The only issue the Supreme Court addressed was whether the environmentalists had standing. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 558.

68. *Id.* at 562–64.

69. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented, on the grounds that the plaintiffs had standing—they had raised a "genuine issue" of material fact—and because the majority erred in broadly rejecting standing for procedural injuries. Blackmun stated, "I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing." *Id.* at

someone interested only in studying or seeing endangered species “anywhere on the globe” could have standing under “animal nexus,” “vocational nexus,” or “ecosystem nexus” theories.⁷⁰ Although Kennedy agreed that the environmentalists in *Defenders* failed to demonstrate concrete injury, he was “not willing to foreclose the possibility . . . that in different circumstances a nexus theory similar to those proffered . . . might support a claim of standing.”⁷¹ Kennedy’s affinity to nexus showings was again evident.

Kennedy’s *Defenders* concurrence also cautioned that the Court should not be understood as foreclosing to foreclose Congress from authorizing new causes of action: “As government programs and policies become more complex and far-reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.”⁷² He noted that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before,” but maintained that Congress must “identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”⁷³ A majority of the Court subsequently adopted this reasoning in 2007, in *Massachusetts v. EPA*.⁷⁴

589–90, 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment because he did not believe Congress intended the consultation requirements of the ESA to apply to activities outside the U.S., but he filed a separate opinion because he disagreed with the Court’s conclusion that the environmentalists lacked standing. *Id.* at 581–82 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter joined Kennedy’s concurrence. *Id.* at 579.

70. *Id.* at 579. Justice Scalia considered such theories to be “beyond all reason.” *Id.* at 566. Justice Kennedy took more than six weeks to decide not to join Justice Scalia’s opinion because he wanted revisions to the section on redressability, objecting to Scalia’s effort to require “particularized injury.” Justice Scalia made some changes, but Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence anyway, a decision that made Justice Scalia “irate,” considering it to have “‘scuttled’ his majority opinion.” See Robert V. Percival, *Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Blackmun Papers*, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,637, 10,659 (2005) (citing Memorandum from Geoffrey M. Klinebert to Justice Blackmun (Jun. 2, 1992), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 591).

71. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing *Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y*, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986), for the proposition that members of a whale-watching and studying organization would be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting).

72. *Id.* at 580.

73. *Id.*

74. *—U.S.—* (April, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). Justice Stevens’s 5-4 majority opinion in *Massachusetts v. EPA* relied heavily on language from Justice Kennedy’s *Defenders* concurrence to support the conclusion that a litigant does not have to satisfy the normal redressability and immediacy requirements for standing when Congress created a procedural right to protect the litigant’s interests: “When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.” *Id.* at 1453 (citing *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 572).

Kennedy's *Defenders* concurrence suggested, however, that Congress failed to identify the injury the citizen suit provision of the ESA sought to vindicate. Therefore, the ESA citizen suit provision did not obviate the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate injury for standing purposes because

while the statute purports to confer a right on "any person . . . to enjoin . . . the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter," it does not of its own force establish that there is an injury "in any person" by virtue of any "violation."⁷⁵

Although he agreed with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the "concrete injury" requirement for standing, he was unwilling to foreclose the possibility that a "nexus" theory of standing might be appropriate under different circumstances.⁷⁶ As in *Lucas*, Kennedy was unwilling to follow the Scalian common-law model as a paradigm for resolving modern environmental controversies.⁷⁷

C. *Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association*

In another 1992 decision, a divided Court ruled that two Illinois hazardous waste licensing laws that required worker training were preempted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).⁷⁸ Justice O'Connor authored the five-member majority

Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that the state of Massachusetts had standing to challenge EPA's decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions because the agency's "steadfast refusal . . . present[ed] a risk of harm to Massachusetts that [was] both 'actual' and 'imminent.'" *Id.* at 1455 (quoting *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560).

75. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580.

76. The requirement that a plaintiff show a "concrete and personal" injury to establish standing, Kennedy wrote, both "preserves the vitality of the adversarial process" and "confines the Judicial Branch to its proper, limited role in the constitutional framework of Government." *Id.* at 581.

77. See Cass R. Sunstein, *What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III*, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 215–20 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's tradition-bound arguments for a narrow concept of Article III standing requiring actual injury); Daniel J. Farber, *Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law*, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547, 555–58 (1997) (discussing Justice Scalia's "campaign against environmental standing" in decisions restricting the judicial role in environmental laws). Justice Scalia made clear his support for constricting standing extra-judicially, in a much-cited 1983 law review article. Antonin Scalia, *The Doctrine of Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers*, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983).

78. *Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n*, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). The state statutes aimed to "promote job safety" and "protect life, limb, and property" by requiring workers who may be exposed to hazardous wastes on the job to take at least forty hours of training under an approved

opinion, concluding that the federal statute impliedly preempted the state laws because they conflicted with the “full purposes and objectives” of OSHA, which indicated that “Congress intended to subject employers and employees to only one set of regulations.”⁷⁹

Justice Kennedy concurred in part, but he disagreed with Justice O’Connor’s reliance on conflict preemption. Instead, he would have found express preemption; he thought Congress, in OSHA, intended to displace state regulations even where there was no actual conflict between state laws and federal regulations.⁸⁰ His willingness to broadly interpret the preemptive effect of OSHA on state hazardous waste worker training statutes showed that Kennedy’s states’ rights perspective did not extend to state laws that appeared to impose duplicative regulations on businesses.

D. Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown

Justice Kennedy finally produced a majority opinion in an environmental case in 1994, seven years after his ascension to the Court. In *C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown*,⁸¹ a town ordinance required all non-hazardous solid waste generated within the town to be deposited at a private waste transfer station that would collect the waste and separate the recyclable from the non-recyclable material.⁸² The ordinance in effect created a local monopoly by guaranteeing a minimum flow of waste to the station, which would then collect a fee in excess of the market rate and, after five years, sell the facility to the town for \$1.⁸³ A private recycler in the town challenged the ordinance’s constitutionality because it prevented him from shipping to cheaper out-

Illinois program, pass a written examination, and complete an annual refresher course. *See id.* at 91. Federal OSHA regulations require hazardous waste workers to receive at least forty hours of training off-site and a minimum of three days of supervised field experience. *See id.* at 92.

79. *Id.* at 98. *Gade* is among a number of Court decisions invalidating state statutes conflicting with federal laws under the doctrine of “obstacle preemption,” in which a state law will be found unconstitutional if it interferes with the underlying purposes of a federal statute. *See* Robert A. Shapiro, *Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism*, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 262 (2005) (discussing recent Court decisions invoking “obstacle preemption” to conclude a state law is unconstitutional although it does not conflict with the actual provisions of a federal law, because it conflicts with the underlying purposes of a federal statute).

80. *Gade*, 505 U.S. at 109 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas. He concluded that “traditional police powers of the State survive until Congress has made a purpose to pre-empt them clear.” *Id.* at 121–22 (Souter, J., dissenting).

81. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).

82. *Id.* at 387.

83. *Id.*

of-state processors, and the Court, in a 6-3 decision, struck down the ordinance as an undue burden on interstate commerce.⁸⁴

For Justice Kennedy, even though the ordinance did not explicitly regulate interstate commerce, “it [did] so nevertheless by its practical effect and design.”⁸⁵ Such a burden could be justified if it were the only method available to advance a legitimate local interest, but because there were alternative ways of financing the town’s transfer facility, the ordinance could not, in Kennedy’s view, survive judicial review.⁸⁶

E. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe

In 1997, during his tenth year on the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote his second majority environmental law opinion, in a case in which state sovereignty loomed large.⁸⁷ The Coeur d’Alene Indian Tribe sued the

84. *Id.* at 384. Justice Kennedy wrote for Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, while Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun.

85. *Id.* at 394. Kennedy relied on a long line of cases he termed “local processing requirements that we have long held invalid.” *Id.* at 391–92 (citing *South-Central Timber Dev. Co. v. Wunnicke*, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (striking down an Alaska regulation that required all Alaska timber to be processed within the state prior to export)). He observed that “[t]he essential vice in laws of this sort is that they bar the import of the processing service. Out-of-state meat inspectors, or shrimp hullers, [are] deprived of access to local demand for their services. Put another way, the offending local laws hoard a local resource [for] the benefit of local businesses that treat it.” *Id.* at 392.

86. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence faulted the majority opinion for characterizing the “flow control” ordinance as discriminating against interstate commerce, when in fact it discriminated against all competition, both local and interstate, but she concluded that it nevertheless imposed excessive burdens on interstate trade in relationship to the local benefits obtained. *Id.* at 401 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter’s dissent (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun) emphasized the fact that the ordinance discriminated against both in-state and out-of-state providers, and “directly aid[ed] the government in satisfying a traditional governmental responsibility.” *Id.* at 410–11 (Souter, J., dissenting).

87. *Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho*, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). Between the *Carbone* and the *Coeur d’Alene* decisions, the Court decided *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a non-environmental law decision but one with considerable implications for environmental law. In *Lopez*, the Court limited Congress’s Commerce Clause power—the basis of most environmental statutes—for the first time in sixty years. *Lopez* led to questions about the constitutionality of the application of the Endangered Species Act to so-called non-commercial species. But four circuit court decisions upheld the application of the statute to species with little or no commercial value on a variety of grounds. See Michael C. Blumm & George N. Kimbrell, *Flies, Wolves, Spiders, Toads, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act’s Take Provision*, 34 ENVTL. L. 309, 327–41 (2004) (discussing the circuit court decisions).

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justice O’Connor, supplied the deciding votes in *Lopez*. His opinion was quite revealing. Although he acknowledged that the history of the Commerce Clause “counsels great restraint” from reviewing courts, Kennedy thought the Gun-Free School Zones Act was beyond congressional power because gun possession had no commercial character, and the “purposes and designs” of the statute had no “commercial nexus.” Where legislation reached beyond commercial activity “in the ordinary and usual sense of the term,” the

state of Idaho and several state agencies and officials in federal district court, claiming that an 1873 Executive Order—which defined the boundaries of the original Coeur d’Alene Reservation—recognized the tribe’s ownership of the bed and banks of Lake Coeur d’Alene long before Idaho became a state in 1890.⁸⁸ The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity, which protects states from federal court suits.⁸⁹ But the Ninth Circuit revived the case under the *Ex parte Young*⁹⁰ exception to the Eleventh Amendment, which allows challenges to state officials implementing unconstitutional laws.⁹¹ The Supreme Court reversed 5-4, with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, although only Chief Justice Rehnquist fully joined his opinion.⁹²

Although an ongoing violation of federal law is generally sufficient to invoke the *Ex parte Young* exception,⁹³ Justice Kennedy concluded that the applicability of the *Young* exception is a function of a case-by-case evaluation of the facts.⁹⁴ Under his factual scrutiny, the tribe’s suit was the “functional equivalent of a quiet title action implicating special sovereignty interests.”⁹⁵ The *Young* exception did not apply because an

judicial role was to inquire into whether the federal government was intruding on an area of traditional state control, because otherwise, the states could lose their role as “laboratories of experimentation.” *Lopez*, 504 U.S. at 668–83.

Kennedy’s search for a factual “nexus”—echoing his willingness to entertain nexus theories of standing in *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), see *supra* notes 70–71, and his circuit court opinion in *Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom*, 679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1982), *supra* notes 30–31—would become characteristic of his approach to environmental cases over the next decade.

88. *Coeur d’Alene*, 521 U.S. 261, 264–65 (1997) (citing Executive Order of Nov. 8, 1873, reprinted in 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 837 (Charles J. Kappler, ed) (1904)). The executive order did not mention the lakebed, but it defined one of the reservation’s boundaries as the point where the Spokane River joined Lake Coeur d’Alene and “thence down along the center of the channel of said Spokane River . . .” *Id.*

89. U.S. CONST., amend. XI.

90. 209 U.S. 123, 155, 159–60 (1908) (holding that a federal court injunction preventing the Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing an unconstitutional state law did not violate the Eleventh Amendment because, when violating the federal Constitution, the state official is “stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct”).

91. *Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho*, 42 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994).

92. *Coeur d’Alene*, 521 U.S. at 263. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas concurred, along with the Chief Justice. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.

93. *Id.* at 281.

94. *Id.* at 280. Justice Kennedy ruled that the only way the tribe’s suit could proceed was under the *Young* exception, as the state’s sovereign immunity applied to the tribe which, for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, had the status of a foreign sovereign. *Id.* at 269.

95. *Id.* at 262.

injunction against state officials would prevent the state from asserting jurisdiction over submerged lands, held in trust for the public, and cause the state's sovereign interest in its waters to be "affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury."⁹⁶

In part of the opinion joined only by the Chief Justice, Kennedy explained that the applicability of the *Young* exception must always be the product of "a careful balancing and accommodation of state interests."⁹⁷ Justice O'Connor, writing for Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurred in the result but did not agree with the balancing. Where there is an ongoing violation of federal law in suits seeking prospective relief, Justice O'Connor thought there was no requirement that federal jurisdiction should be predicated on a judicial balancing of federal and state interests.⁹⁸ Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor did not often disagree,⁹⁹ but in the *Coeur d'Alene* case, Kennedy showed himself to be more devoted to judicial balancing and state sovereignty than O'Connor.¹⁰⁰

96. *Id.* at 287. This quote nicely foreshadowed Kennedy's approach to the retroactive legislation at issue in *Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), *infra* notes 103–104, 106 and accompanying text.

97. *Coeur d'Alene*, 521 U.S. at 278.

98. *Id.* at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, Justice O'Connor thought that the *Young* exception was inapplicable in this case because an injunction against state officials would amount to divesting the state of regulatory authority, the equivalent of a quiet title action to sovereign lands. Thus, the suit was effectively against the state itself, and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. *Id.*

99. See *infra* note 199, noting that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were in agreement in eighty-nine percent of the cases discussed in this study in which both participated. Their tendency to agree in environmental cases is also reflected in O'Connor's environmental protection score, as updated by Cannon, *supra* note 7, which as of the 2004 term was 36.1 percent, just two percent better than Justice Kennedy's score of 34.1 percent. *Id.*

100. The tribe ultimately prevailed when it persuaded the federal government, which is not limited by the Eleventh Amendment, to file suit against the state, and a 5-4 Court upheld the tribal claim as a valid pre-statehood reservation. *Idaho v. United States*, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). Justice Souter wrote a majority opinion in the case, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, O'Connor, and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, which took issue with the majority's opinion because the Chief Justice did not find sufficient evidence of congressional intent to convey the submerged lands beneath Lake Coeur d'Alene prior to granting Idaho statehood. *Id.* at 288 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This case was one of Justice Kennedy's three full environmental dissents. In *Apfel*, *infra* notes 103–106 and accompanying text, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but dissented in part. See *infra* Appendix A case table.

F. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

In 1998, the Court invalidated provisions of the federal Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, which required companies previously employing coal miners to pay some of their health care costs in retirement, even if the companies had left the coal mining business.¹⁰¹ A four-justice plurality, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, thought that the statute worked a compensable taking of property by "impos[ing] severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience."¹⁰² Supplying the decisive fifth vote to strike down the statute, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality on the takings issue, finding that "the mechanism by which the Government injures Eastern is so unlike the act of taking specific property that it is incongruous to call the Coal Act a taking"¹⁰³

In the absence of a specific property interest to trigger the takings clause, Kennedy maintained that the retroactive effect of the legislation was more appropriately evaluated under the due process clause, not the takings clause.¹⁰⁴ His reluctance to employ the takings clause to scrutinize the wisdom of legislation would eventually gain a majority of the Court in the 2005 *Lingle* decision.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, Kennedy's willingness to employ substantive due process, at least in the context of a statute imposing retroactive liability, might be the product of his fidelity to factual analysis. In *Apfel*, he was able to employ the

101. *E. Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701–22 (1994)).

102. *Id.* at 528–29. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.

103. *Id.* at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence.

104. *Id.* at 547–49:

Although we have been hesitant to subject economic legislation to due process scrutiny as a general matter, the Court has given careful consideration to due process challenges to legislation with retroactive effects. . . .

. . . .

The case before us represents one of the rare instances where the Legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by due process. . . . [By] creating liability for events which occurred 35 years ago the Coal Act has a retroactive effect of unprecedented scope.

The four-member dissent agreed with Justice Kennedy that the statute should be evaluated on due process grounds, but thought that the lifetime benefits required by the legislation were reasonable considering the profits that the coal miners provided to the corporation and the foreseeable nature of the miners' illnesses. *Id.* at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

105. *See infra* notes 215–226 and accompanying text.

substantive due process inquiry to balance the health problems of former coal company employees against the retroactive nature of the liability imposed on the companies in favor of the latter.¹⁰⁶

G. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey

In 1999, Justice Kennedy wrote his third environmental law majority opinion for the Court, in a case concerning a long-running dispute over the proposed development of an environmentally sensitive thirty-seven acre tract of beach in Monterey, California, that had been formerly used as an oil terminal.¹⁰⁷ The developer had originally proposed 344 residential units, but the proposal was scaled back during five years of negotiations with the city to 190 units.¹⁰⁸ Even though the 190-unit development preserved roughly half of the acreage as open space, the city council ultimately denied land use approval, citing concerns over the adequacy of public access and environmental damage, especially destruction of habitat of the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly.¹⁰⁹ The developer filed a federal suit under § 1983,¹¹⁰ alleging a compensable taking.¹¹¹ After an initial round of litigation over the ripeness of the city's appeal,¹¹² the district court submitted the developer's takings

106. *Apfel*, 524 U.S. at 549–50 (“While we have upheld the imposition of liability on former employers based on past employment relationships, the statutes at issue were remedial, designed to impose an ‘actual, measurable cost of [the employer’s] business’ which the employer had been able to avoid in the past . . . The Coal Act, however, does not serve this purpose. Eastern was once in the coal business and employed many of the beneficiaries, but [their] expectation of lifetime benefits . . . [was] created by promises and agreements made long after Eastern left the coal business. . . . This case is far outside the bounds of retroactivity permissible under our law.”).

107. *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999).

108. *Id.* at 695–96.

109. *Id.* at 696–98. The oil company that formerly owned the property had introduced a non-native ice plant to help control erosion on the site. The ice plant crowded out native plants, spreading over a quarter of the property by the time of the proposed development. The invasive ice plant largely supplanted native buckwheat, habitat for the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly (*Euphilotes enoptes smithi*). *Id.* at 695. The Smith's Blue Butterfly, which lives in two species of buckwheat on the California coast from Monterey Bay through Point Gorda, was listed as an endangered species under the ESA in 1976, after invasive plants and coastal development destroyed much of its native habitat. 41 Fed. Reg. 22,041 (Jun. 1, 1976). See Essig Museum of Entomology, University of California at Berkeley, California's Endangered Insects – Smith's Blue Butterfly, <http://essig.berkeley.edu/endins/euphilsm.htm> (last visited June 29, 2007).

110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (making those who use the color of state law to deprive citizens of their rights under federal law liable to the injured party).

111. *Del Monte Dunes*, 526 U.S. at 694.

112. The district court ruled that the developer's takings claim was not ripe because it failed to exhaust its remedies under state law, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that California law did not authorize compensation for a temporary taking. *Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v.*

claim to a jury, which awarded the developer \$1.45 million in temporary taking damages.¹¹³ The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the takings claim was properly submitted to the jury, and that the evidence supported the developer's contention that the city's repeated denials were disproportionate to the proposal's nature and effect.¹¹⁴ The Supreme Court accepted *certiorari*.¹¹⁵

Justice Kennedy wrote for a narrow five-member majority, which upheld the appropriateness of submitting the takings claim to the jury.¹¹⁶ Although the Court unanimously rejected the application of the "rough proportionality" test of *Dolan v. Tigard*¹¹⁷ to land use decisions not involving exactions dedicating private property to public use,¹¹⁸ the jury issue fractured the Court.

Justice Kennedy decided that the jury was not evaluating the reasonableness of the city's land use regulations, but whether the city's rejection of the Del Monte development was reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose.¹¹⁹ Consequently, it was within the trial court's

City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990).

113. *Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey*, 95 F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996). The developer won temporary takings damages, despite the fact that the value of the property increased substantially throughout the protracted litigation: selling for \$3.7 million in 1984, three years after the case was filed, and then selling again to the state for \$4.5 million in 1991. See Nancy E. Stroud, *Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey: How Far Does It Limit "Rough Proportionality" in Land Use Cases?*, A.B.A. PROPERTY & PROBATE MAG., SEP.–OCT. 2000, <http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/2000/so00stroud.html>.

114. *Del Monte Dunes*, 95 F.3d at 1432.

115. *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 523 U.S. 1045 (1998).

116. *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687, 707–22 (1999).

117. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that conditioning a hardware store's building permit on dedication of a public greenway and bicycle path lacked a "rough proportionality" to the public costs of the development, and thus was a taking under the Fifth Amendment). In a memo to Justice Blackmun regarding the case, Kennedy noted that he agreed with Scalia's suggestion that Rehnquist include the phrase "rough proportionality" in the *Dolan* opinion because he felt the case needed stronger language to ensure that land use regulators sufficiently justified regulatory exactions. Kennedy thought "it important to state that the exaction must be commensurate, though not to the point of demanding exact mathematical precision . . ." See Percival, *supra* note 70, at 10,656, (quoting Memorandum from Justice Kennedy to Chief Justice Rehnquist (May 16, 1994), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 645). Blackmun included in his notes on the *Dolan* decision that Kennedy had remarked that "the cities are not hurting" and that the "burden of proof [is] on the city" to justify an exaction. *Id.*

118. Both the majority, *Del Monte Dunes*, 526 U.S. at 703, and the dissent, *id.* at 733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) agreed that *Dolan's* "rough proportionality" test was not applicable to this case, since it involved no exaction requiring dedication of private land to the public.

119. *Id.* at 706.

discretion to grant a jury trial.¹²⁰ Further, Kennedy ruled that a federal suit seeking damages for an unconstitutional denial of compensation for a taking fell within the scope of the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial.¹²¹ But, his opinion was careful to limit the scope of the Court's decision concerning the availability of federal jury trials. Kennedy reasoned that the right to a jury trial extended to § 1983 suits challenging the reasonableness of a specific governmental denial, not to suits challenging the reasonableness of the regulations themselves.¹²² Justice Scalia's concurrence advocated a much broader federal right to a jury trial, while the four-member dissent, authored by Justice Souter, denied any federal right to a jury trial for takings claimants.¹²³ Characteristically, Justice Kennedy pursued a middle road between the Scalian position and that of the Court's moderates.

H. Amoco v. Southern Ute Tribe

Justice Kennedy authored his fourth majority environmental law opinion, one which involved public lands, in 1999¹²⁴ The Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 reserved "coal" on certain public lands to the federal government, which the government then made available for homesteading, including lands the Southern Ute Tribe had ceded to the United States in 1880.¹²⁵ In 1938, the federal government conveyed any interest it had in the ceded lands, including its "coal" rights, back to the tribe.¹²⁶ Subsequently, coalbed methane gas became an important energy resource, and oil and gas producers obtained rights to extract it from the homesteaders' successors.¹²⁷ In 1991, the Southern Ute Tribe filed suit,

120. *Id.* at 721.

121. *Id.* at 720–21 (“[W]hether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a predominantly factual question . . . in actions at law otherwise within the purview of the Seventh Amendment, this question is for the jury.”).

122. *Id.* at 721–22 (interpreting the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and distinguishing a takings claim from a condemnation claim, in which there is no right to a jury trial).

123. *Id.* at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); *id.* at 733 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

124. *Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe*, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).

125. *See id.* at 869–70 (*citing* Coal Lands Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 844, 30 U.S.C. § 81; Coal Lands Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 583, 30 U.S.C. §§ 83–85) (explaining the context of the Coal Lands Acts, which followed a 1906 withdrawal of sixty-four million acres of public land from homesteading by President Theodore Roosevelt to prevent coal companies from employing homestead laws to speculate in coal).

126. *Id.* at 870.

127. *Id.* at 871 (noting that oil and gas companies leased some 200,000 acres of land from landowners in which the tribe owns the underlying coal).

claiming that it owned the coalbed methane gas, since the gas was included in the government's reservation in the 1909 and 1910 statutes.¹²⁸ The district court ruled against the tribe, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.¹²⁹

In a 7-1 decision, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in *Amoco Products Co. v. Southern Ute Tribes*¹³⁰ reversed the Tenth Circuit and rejected the tribe's claims.¹³¹ Kennedy observed that the question was "not whether, given what scientists know today, it makes sense to regard [coalbed methane] gas as a constituent of coal but whether Congress so regarded it in 1909 and 1910."¹³² He concluded that Congress did not, because the "common conception" of coal when the statutes passed was solid rock; in fact, the associated gas was considered a dangerous and valueless byproduct.¹³³ This "natural interpretation" of the meaning of "coal" in 1909-10 as not encompassing the associated gas was sufficient to persuade Kennedy and the majority not to employ the public land law interpretive canon that "ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor of the sovereign or the competing canons relied on by [the tribe]."¹³⁴ Among the interpretive rules that Justice Kennedy disregarded were the Indian law canons that courts should construe ambiguities in favor of tribes and interpret statutes liberally in their favor.¹³⁵

This result was strange, given that both the federal government and the tribe argued that the Coal Lands Acts reserved the methane gas. But, Kennedy and the majority were unwilling to defer to the government, the public land canon, or the Indian law canons; instead,

128. *Id.*

129. *See* *S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co.*, 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1154 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that Congress intended to reserve solid rock coal, not coal bed methane gas, based on the plain meaning of the term "coal"); *S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co.*, 119 F.3d 816, 826 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the text of the Coal Lands Acts did not indicate one way or the other whether Congress intended to reserve coalbed methane gas, and that ambiguities in mineral reservations should be resolved in favor of the government). An *en banc* panel of the Tenth Circuit upheld this decision. *S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co.*, 151 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998).

130. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).

131. *Id.* at 880. Justice Breyer did not take part in the decision. Only Justice Ginsburg dissented. *Id.* at 880-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that ambiguities in land grants should be construed in favor of the federal government, especially because at the time of the Coal Lands Acts, the gas was considered a potential liability that would have been the responsibility of whoever had title to the coal).

132. *Id.* at 873.

133. *Id.* at 874-75.

134. *Id.* at 880.

135. *See* COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 119-24 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005).

they favored a “natural interpretation” of the meaning of “coal” from ninety years earlier.¹³⁶ Perhaps Kennedy viewed the case as the equivalent of an attempt to impose retroactive property loss on the oil and gas companies.¹³⁷

I. The Kennedy Environmental Record Prior to 2000

In Justice Kennedy’s first dozen years on the Supreme Court, he showed himself to be devoted to fact-based balancing, skeptical of broad doctrinal changes, and committed to a nuanced approach to most environmental issues. Although he subscribed to the categorical takings doctrine established in *Lucas*, he wanted a larger nuisance exception than Justice Scalia articulated for the Court, and he was concerned about fashioning a doctrine protective of “fragile” lands.¹³⁸ And while Kennedy denied environmentalists standing in *Defenders*, he indicated an openness to animal, vocational, and ecosystem nexus theories of standing.¹³⁹ Kennedy is a professed adherent to state sovereignty,¹⁴⁰ but he is willing to preempt state statutes to prevent overregulation,¹⁴¹ and he will employ the Commerce Clause for the same purpose.¹⁴² He was open to jury trials to decide takings cases under limited circumstances¹⁴³ but opposed to employing takings doctrine to question the wisdom of

136. *Amoco*, 526 U.S. at 880.

137. Note the similarity to Kennedy’s aversion to retroactive regulation in *Apfel*, *supra* note 106, as well as the sentiments he voiced in *Coeur d’Alene*, *supra* notes 98–100. Dean David Getches has shown how the Court frequently employs subjective equitable balancing in Indian cases rather than employ foundational Indian law principles. David H. Getches, *Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values*, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 344–50 (2001). See also David H. Getches, *Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law*, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1644–45 (1996) (surveying Justice Kennedy’s Indian law jurisprudence, which includes joining every opinion denying tribal sovereign immunity, and noting that Justice Kennedy “has displayed a profound disinterest in Indian law . . .”).

138. See *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992), discussed *supra* note 61 and accompanying text.

139. See *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992), discussed *supra* note 70 and accompanying text.

140. See, e.g., *Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho*, 521 U.S. 261, 278 (1997), discussed *supra* note and accompanying text.

141. See *Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n*, 505 U.S. 88, 109 (1992), discussed *supra* note 80 and accompanying text.

142. See *C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown*, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994), discussed *supra* note 85 and accompanying text.

143. See *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999), discussed *supra* note 119–120 and accompanying text.

legislation.¹⁴⁴ He will interpret legislation protecting fragile lands and establishing ecosystem-nexus causes of action generously,¹⁴⁵ but he does not generously interpret retroactive legislation.¹⁴⁶ This nuanced approach to environmental claims would continue after 2000.

III. DECISIONS OF 2000–04

The new millennium saw Justice Kennedy make some surprising comments about the effect of the Executive's authority on Congress's ability to authorize the imposition of civil penalties as a result of citizen suits.¹⁴⁷ He also continued his readiness to preempt state statutes in the interest of eliminating duplicative regulation.¹⁴⁸ And he supported a relaxed ripeness doctrine and the elimination of the government's categorical defense for pre-existing regulations in takings cases.¹⁴⁹ At the same time he endorsed a large view of property that made successful takings claims against environmental regulation unlikely.¹⁵⁰ In his sole written dissent in an environmental case, his view of cooperative federalism led him to endorse a non-statutory interpretation of the Clean Water Act that reflected his view that states' rights are more important than environmental protection.¹⁵¹

A. *Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw*

Whether environmentalists could maintain a Clean Water Act citizen suit for civil penalties drew a curious concurrence from Justice Kennedy in 2000 in *Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw*.¹⁵² The environmentalists

144. See *E. Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498, 542, 545 (1998), discussed *supra* notes 103–104.

145. See *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032–36 (1992), discussed *supra* note 58–61 and accompanying text (fragile lands); *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 579–81 (1992), discussed *supra* notes 70–75 (ecosystem-nexus theory of standing).

146. See *supra* note 137 and accompanying text (discussing *Amoco*, *Apfel*, and *Coeur d'Alene*).

147. See *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 193, 197 (2000), discussed *infra* notes 159–160 and accompanying text.

148. See *United States v. Locke*, 529 U.S. 89, 105–16 (2000), discussed *infra* notes 161–171 and accompanying text.

149. See *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606, 625–27 (2001), discussed *infra* notes 175–182 and accompanying text.

150. See *id.* at 632, discussed *infra* note 183 and accompanying text (Kennedy refusing the landowner's invitation to conceptually sever his property by looking only at the restricted wetlands and ignoring the unregulated uplands which retained substantial economic value).

151. See *Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461, 502–18 (2004), discussed *infra* notes 194–203 and accompanying text.

152. 528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

claimed that they fished in and recreated on waters polluted by a company's mercury discharges in violation of its Clean Water Act permit.¹⁵³ The district court agreed that the company had violated its permit and imposed a civil fine of over \$400,000, but it declined to issue an injunction because the company had achieved substantial compliance with its permit during the litigation.¹⁵⁴ The Fourth Circuit reversed, on the ground that the environmentalists' suit was moot, because the only available remedy, the payment of civil penalties to the government, would not redress any injury they suffered.¹⁵⁵

The Supreme Court upheld the environmentalists' standing, reversing the Fourth Circuit in a 7-2 decision written by Justice Ginsburg.¹⁵⁶ The majority ruled that civil penalties in citizen suits do in fact redress a plaintiff's injuries, due to the deterrent effect they have on future violations.¹⁵⁷ The majority also held that the suit was not moot, because the company failed to prove that it was "absolutely clear" that the permit violations would not recur.¹⁵⁸

Justice Kennedy issued a cryptic concurrence in *Laidlaw*, raising the question of the constitutionality of civil penalties in citizen suits:

153. *Id.* at 181–183.

154. *See id.* at 178.

155. *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.*, 149 F.3d 303, 306–07 (4th Cir. (1998)).

156. *Laidlaw*, 528 U.S. at 173–74. Although Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard Law School for a year, she graduated from Columbia Law School. When she was nominated by President Clinton, Kennedy sent a note to Justice Blackmun (like Kennedy, a Harvard Law School graduate) that the Court was still one vote short of a Harvard Law School majority (with Ginsburg replacing Byron White, a Yale Law School alum), although he did state, "But if you are patient, we shall prevail. Tony." *See Percival, supra* note 70, at 10,661 (citing Note from Justice Kennedy to Justice Blackmun (Jun. 14, 1993), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 116). And Justice Kennedy was correct: with the appointment of Chief Justice Roberts, Harvard Law School now has a five-member majority on the Court.

157. *Laidlaw*, 528 U.S. at 185. The Court distinguished the case from *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment*, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (finding no standing, due to lack of redressability, for environmentalists to bring a suit for civil penalties because the company agreed to comply with the permit), on the ground that in *Steel Co.*, there was no allegation of any continuing or imminent violation, whereas in *Laidlaw*, the violations were "ongoing at the time of the complaint" and "could continue into the future if undeterred." *Laidlaw*, 528 U.S. at 188. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented because they believed *Steel Co.* should have controlled: "a plaintiff's desire to benefit from the deterrent effect of a public penalty for past conduct can never suffice to establish [standing]." *Id.* at 205. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in *Steel Co.*, but he also joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which cautioned against interpreting the Court's opinion to create an "exhaustive list of circumstances under which a federal court may exercise judgment" in assuming jurisdiction, an apparent effort to preserve trial court discretion and limit the reach of the majority's opinion. *Steel Co.*, 523 U.S. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

158. *Laidlaw*, 528 U.S. at 193.

Difficult and fundamental questions are raised when we ask whether exactions of public fines by private litigants, and the delegation of Executive power which might be inferable from the authorization, are permissible in view of the responsibilities committed to the Executive by Article II of the Constitution of the United States.¹⁵⁹

With these words, Kennedy seemed to open the door for constitutional challenges to statutory civil penalty provisions based on congressional interference with Article II's directive that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."¹⁶⁰

B. United States v. Locke

Justice Kennedy authored his fifth environmental law majority opinion in 2000, this one for a unanimous Court, in another preemption case. In *United States v. Locke*,¹⁶¹ the Court invalidated Washington state laws, passed in the wake of the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill, regulating oil tankers in the state's waters.¹⁶² An oil tanker trade association challenged the state's regulations on the grounds that federal uniformity preempted state authority to regulate vessels. After the district court upheld the state regulations, the federal government intervened on behalf of the tanker operators, but the Ninth Circuit upheld all but one of the state regulations.¹⁶³

159. *Id.* at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

160. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3. This sentiment echoed one expressed by Justice Scalia eight years earlier in *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992), when he wrote, "To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . .'"

161. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).

162. *United States v. Locke*, 529 U.S. 89, 96-97 (2000). Washington created a state Office of Marine Safety and directed it to devise standards for spill prevention plans which would provide the "best achievable protection" from oil spills. The ensuing regulations developed by the agency regulated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. If a vessel failed to comply with these regulations, it could be subject to penalties, restrictions on its ability to operate in the state's waters, or be barred from access to the state's waters. *Id.* at 97; *see also* WASH. REV. CODE § 88.46.040(3) (1994) (directing the Office of Marine Safety to develop oil tanker standards); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 317-21-130, 317-21-200-265 (1999) (providing requirements for oil tankers operating in Washington waters); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 88.46.070, 88.46.080, 88.46.090 (establishing possible sanctions for violating the operating requirements).

163. *See Locke*, 529 U.S. at 98 (citing Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996), and Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (1998)).

The Supreme Court reversed.¹⁶⁴ Justice Kennedy interpreted the savings clause in the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990¹⁶⁵—legislation Congress passed as its own reaction to the *Exxon Valdez* spill—to create only a limited exception to the general rule of federal preemption in maritime law, allowing states to continue to enforce liability rules against companies responsible for oil spills.¹⁶⁶ Subject to this limited exception in the OPA, Kennedy ruled that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972¹⁶⁷ controls vessel regulation, and the OPA did not affect the 1972 law’s preemptive effect on conflicting state regulations.¹⁶⁸ While a state may have a legitimate interest in passing regulations to prevent an environmental disaster like an oil spill, he maintained that the Court must inquire into whether the local laws are consistent with the federal scheme, including the 1972 statute’s objective of providing “uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce.”¹⁶⁹ The Court therefore invalidated some of the Washington regulations as preempted by federal law and remanded the remainder for reconsideration by the district court.¹⁷⁰ Justice Kennedy did acknowledge the potential widespread harm to the environment that the state was attempting to avoid, but he maintained that the Court had to focus on “political responsibility,” and he made no effort to determine whether the federal laws alone provided adequate protection to the marine environment.¹⁷¹

C. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

In 2001, Kennedy issued his sixth environmental law majority opinion, writing for a 5-4 majority that faulted the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s rejection of Anthony Palazzolo’s takings claim concerning the state’s denial of his plans to develop his coastal property by filling wetlands.¹⁷² The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial

164. *Locke*, 529 U.S. at 99, 117.

165. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (2000).

166. *Locke*, 529 U.S. at 105.

167. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1223(a)(1) (2000).

168. *Locke*, 529 U.S. at 107.

169. *Id.* at 108.

170. *Id.* at 112–17.

171. *Id.* at 117 (“When one contemplates the weight and immense mass of oil ever in transit by tankers, the oil’s proximity to coastal life, and its destructive power even if a spill occurs far upon the open sea, international, federal, and state regulation may be insufficient protection. Sufficiency, however, is not the question before us.”).

172. *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606, 611–14 (2001). The wetlands were actually a salt

court's rejection of Palazzolo's argument that the state's wetland regulations worked a taking of his property because 1) his claim was not ripe, 2) he had no right to challenge regulations that pre-dated his acquisition of the site,¹⁷³ and 3) the uplands on his property remained developable, thus leaving Palazzolo with substantial economic value.¹⁷⁴

Writing for a fractured Court,¹⁷⁵ Justice Kennedy reversed on the ripeness and pre-existing regulation grounds.¹⁷⁶ As in *Del Monte Dunes*,¹⁷⁷ Palazzolo had submitted multiple unsuccessful applications, and because of the "unequivocal nature" of the state's regulations, Kennedy concluded that submission of further development plans would

marsh subject to tidal flooding. *Id.* at 606.

173. Palazzolo's corporation actually acquired the site in the 1950s, before enactment of the state's wetland regulations. But, by the time the state dissolved the corporation in 1978 (because of tax delinquency), and title passed to Palazzolo as an individual, the state's wetland regulations were in effect. *See id.* at 613–14.

174. *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 746 A.2d 707, 714, 717 (R.I. 2000). The court reached its conclusion that Palazzolo's takings claim was not ripe because he had never applied for a permit to develop the seventy-four lot subdivision he used as the basis for his claim. Nor had he applied to develop the land in a manner that would involve less intensive filling of wetlands.

175. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia filed separate concurring opinions. *Palazzolo*, 533 U.S. at 610. Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that the Court's holding that post-regulatory acquisition of a property did not automatically bar a takings claim should not be interpreted to mean that the prior existence of the regulation was not relevant to whether a taking occurred within the framework of *Penn Central* balancing (*see infra* note 182 and accompanying text), as evidence of the regulation's effect on both investment-backed expectations and the character of the government action. *Palazzolo* at 633–34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurrence objected to this notion that an existing regulation should be considered as part of the investment-backed expectation inquiry because, in his opinion, *Penn Central* balancing "should have no bearing" in determining whether there was a "total taking." *Id.* at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring). *See infra* note 182.

Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion in its determination that the takings claim was ripe because the regulations at issue prohibited any development of the wetlands. But because Palazzolo gained title to the property only after the regulations had become effective, Stevens thought he lacked standing to challenge regulations pre-dating his ownership of the property. *Palazzolo*, 533 U.S. at 642–43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg filed a dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, disagreeing with Justice Kennedy's ripeness conclusion. She agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court that Palazzolo's takings claim was not ripe because he had never sought to develop only the upland portion of the property that was not affected by the state wetlands regulations. *Id.* at 647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent to note that while acquisition of a parcel of land after the adoption of restrictive zoning regulations may not automatically bar a takings claim, that fact should be evaluated using *Penn Central* balancing, endorsing Justice O'Connor's conclusion. *Id.* at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

176. *Id.* at 618–30.

177. *See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), *supra* note 107 and accompanying text.

have been futile, and therefore the suit was ripe.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the majority overturned the state court rule barring a takings challenge because of regulations pre-dating the landowner's acquisition of the property, declaring that "[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle."¹⁷⁹ Thus, the Court rejected the so-called "notice rule," by which government defendants could categorically defeat takings claims where the landowner acquired the property after promulgation of the restrictive regulation.¹⁸⁰ According to Justice Kennedy, the proper inquiry for takings purposes was whether a landowner's predecessor could have successfully maintained a takings claim.¹⁸¹ This position did not represent a majority of the Court, however, as Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that landowner notice of existing regulations was a highly relevant factor in determining both the reasonableness of a landowner's investment-backed expectations and the regulation's economic effect under the Court's dominant takings test, the so-called *Penn Central* balancing.¹⁸²

178. *Palazzolo*, 533 U.S. at 619; *see also id.* at 625–26 ("Where the state agency charged with enforcing a challenged land-use regulation entertains an application from an owner and its denial of the application makes clear the extent of development permitted . . . federal ripeness rules do not require the submission of further and futile applications . . .").

179. *Id.* at 627. *See infra* note 302 (describing the meaning of "Hobbesian"). For an insightful reexamination of property as a bundle of rights, including rights of the state, *see* Myrl L. Duncan, *Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource*, 32 ENVTL L. 773 (2002).

180. *Palazzolo*, 533 U.S. at 628 ("A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate what is taken."). On the so-called notice rule, *see* Danaya C. Wright, *A New Time For Denominators: Toward A Dynamic Theory Of Property In The Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis*, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 188–90 (2004); Steven J. Eagle, *The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule*, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 533, 534 (2002); Michael C. Blumm, *Palazzolo and the Decline of Justice Scalia's Categorical Takings Doctrine*, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 137, 143–47 (2002).

181. *Palazzolo*, 533 U.S. at 627 ("Were we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.").

182. *Id.* at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The *Penn Central* balancing test was inaugurated by Justice Brennan's opinion in *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York*, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). *See* Lazarus, *supra* note 55, at 767–72 (discussing how the Court developed the *Penn Central* test); Bradley C. Karkkainen, *The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings "Muddle"*, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 875–82 (2006) (tracing how the historic trend of construing substantive due process claims as takings contributed to the *Penn Central* result); Eric R. Claeys, *The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property Theory*, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (2006) (discussing how different Supreme Court justices have adapted the *Penn Central* test to reach desired conclusions); John D. Echeverria, *Making Sense of Penn Central*, 23 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171 (2005) (explaining why the widespread benefits of a government program and whether it attempts to prevent nuisance-like activity are relevant factors in

The result proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for the landowner, for Justice Kennedy did not disturb the Rhode Island Supreme Court's ruling that Palazzolo retained substantial value in the unregulated upland portion of his property.¹⁸³ Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island courts to determine whether the wetlands regulation worked a *Penn Central*-type taking.¹⁸⁴ Palazzolo was unsuccessful in this effort.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, although Palazzolo was unable to destroy the wetlands in pursuit of his proposed development, Justice Kennedy's opinion was largely favorable to the landowner because it relaxed ripeness rules, eliminated the regulatory notice as a categorical governmental defense, and demonstrated considerable suspicion of the state's "Hobbesian" environmental regulations.¹⁸⁶

D. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA

2004 witnessed the only dissent Justice Kennedy wrote among the eighty environmental cases in this survey. At issue was whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could issue Clean Air Act compliance orders against the state of Alaska to stop the construction of

Penn Central balancing).

Justice Scalia, also in the majority, wrote a separate concurrence largely criticizing Justice O'Connor's approach, and suggesting the pre-existing notice of regulatory restrictions should have no effect on whether a regulation worked a taking, except where it formed a "background principle" of state property law, so that a *Penn Central* takings claim would be unaffected by transfers of title. *Id.* at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Lazarus, *supra* note 55 at 817 (stating that Justice Scalia wrote his separate concurrence in *Palazzolo* for the "purpose of taking deliberate and harsh aim at O'Connor").

183. *Palazzolo*, 533 U.S. at 632. The regulation had not eliminated all value of Palazzolo's property, as it was worth an estimated \$200,000 with the regulation (although nearly \$3.2 million without the regulation). Justice Kennedy wrote that under these circumstances, there was no *Lucas*-type taking because Palazzolo retained more than a "token interest," and the regulation did not leave the land "economically idle." *Id.* at 631.

184. *Id.* at 630.

185. *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001). Following the Court's decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case to the state superior court to analyze the takings claim under *Penn Central*. *Id.* at 561. The superior court concluded that the proposed development's negative effects on nearby Winnapaug Pond constituted a public nuisance. *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (R.I. Super. 2005). Further, because one half of Palazzolo's property fell below the mean high tide line, under the state's public trust doctrine, the state holds these lands in trust for the public. *Id.* at *6-7. Thus, Palazzolo had no right to fill any wetlands below the mean high tide line without state legislative permission, significantly diminishing any reasonable investment-backed expectations he might have had for developing the property. *Id.* at *12-14.

186. See *supra* notes 178 (ripeness), 180 (notice rule), 179 (Hobbesian state power) and accompanying text.

a polluting facility after the EPA concluded that the state's determination of "best available control technology" (BACT) to reduce plant emissions was unreasonable.¹⁸⁷ EPA and the states make BACT determinations on a case-by-case basis, considering energy, environmental, and economic factors.¹⁸⁸ Each state administers its own EPA-approved clean air program, but EPA has enforcement authority as well, and the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to take remedial action against any state not in compliance with the statute, including issuing "an order prohibiting the construction."¹⁸⁹ EPA invoked this authority to prevent the Alaska state agency from issuing a permit to the facility, alleging that the state-prescribed BACT measures were unreasonable.¹⁹⁰ The state maintained that under the Clean Air Act, only a state has the authority to decide which technology is "best available."¹⁹¹

A five-member Court majority, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, sided with EPA, even though it refused to give *Chevron* deference to EPA guidance documents.¹⁹² Nonetheless, the Court considered EPA's interpretation of its enforcement authority to be reasonable, based on an administrative record that showed the state's BACT would produce considerably more emissions than alternative technology, and that

187. *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461, 468 (2004). Under the Clean Air Act's "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" program for airsheds in compliance with national ambient air quality standards, construction of any facility resulting in "major" emissions must be equipped with BACT. *Id.*

188. *See id.* at 468 (citing Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000)).

189. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5)(A). *See also id.* § 7477 ("prevention of significant deterioration" provision also authorizing EPA to issue "an order . . . to prevent the construction . . . of a facility . . ." that does not meet PSD requirements).

190. *See Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation*, 540 U.S. at 474, 480 (describing the exchanges in the permitting process for the Red Dog Mine, a zinc concentrate mine 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle, which led to EPA's 1999 order).

191. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining "best available control technology" to mean "an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation . . . which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant").

192. *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation*, 540 U.S. at 487. Under *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts give deference to reasonable agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities if regulations are promulgated as part of a public accessible process, like notice and comment rulemaking. In this case, the Court accorded EPA's guidance only "respect," as called for by *Christensen v. Harris County*, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) and *United States v. Mead Corp.*, 533 U.S. 218, 237–38 (2001).

included no evidence indicating that such an alternative was economically infeasible.¹⁹³

Justice Kennedy, for a four-member dissent that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, thought that the EPA lacked authority to take enforcement action against a state exercising its statutory discretion.¹⁹⁴ Instead, he believed that the EPA should have challenged the state's BACT determination in state proceedings.¹⁹⁵ He also charged the majority with giving the EPA interpretation inappropriate deference, maintaining that the majority "opinion is chock-full of *Chevron*-like language."¹⁹⁶ In Kennedy's judgment, the majority abrogated the cooperative federalism scheme Congress constructed in the Clean Air Act. He declared that "federal agencies cannot consign States to the ministerial tasks of information gathering and making initial recommendations, while reserving to themselves the authority to make final judgments under the guise of surveillance and oversight."¹⁹⁷

The *Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation* decision is a telling one. Justice Kennedy not only issued his only written dissent in an environmental case,¹⁹⁸ but he also departed from his fellow centrist, Justice O'Connor, which was a rare event.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, while the case turned on the intricacies of a complex federal statute, one would have thought that those intricacies supported the respect the majority gave to the agency charged with the administration of the statute, even if *Chevron* deference was inappropriate. Further, the text of the Clean Air Act twice authorized the EPA to enforce against non-complying states and facilities.²⁰⁰ But neither that text, nor the statute's complexity mattered as much to Justice Kennedy as his conception of the federal-state balance implicit in the statute's structure. Although quick to find federal preemption of state tanker safety and hazardous waste worker

193. *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation*, 540 U.S. at 501-02.

194. *Id.* at 503 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

195. *Id.* at 509.

196. *Id.* at 517.

197. *Id.* at 518.

198. Professor Lazarus, the closest observer of the Court's environmental law opinions, considers Justice Kennedy "the most significant Justice in environmental cases, at least to the extent that he has been in the majority more often than any other Justice, often providing the decisive fifth vote." Richard J. Lazarus, *Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Environmental Law*, 24 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 231, 250 (2006).

199. Of the cases we consider in this study, O'Connor and Kennedy agreed in sixty-seven of the seventy-five cases in which both participated, or eighty-nine percent of the time. These statistics count only agreement with the majority or the dissent, not separate concurrences.

200. See *supra* note 190 and accompanying text.

training requirements,²⁰¹ and willing to strike down a local recycling ordinance as an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce,²⁰² Kennedy seemed to see in the Clean Air Act a kind of “reverse preemption” in which state action foreclosed federal action. He accused the majority of taking “a great step backward in Congress’ design to grant States a significant stake in developing and enforcing national environmental objectives.”²⁰³

E. Kennedy and the Environment in 2000–04

Justice Kennedy’s decisions in the early 2000s did not represent a sharp deviation from the path he set in his first years on the Court,²⁰⁴ as he continued to maintain his nuanced approach. He remained willing to preempt state legislation to prevent perceived overregulation,²⁰⁵ and he continued to encourage takings claims by reducing ripeness barriers and eliminating government defenses based on notice of existing regulations.²⁰⁶ But, he managed to defeat most takings claims by endorsing a large view of the property in *Palazzolo*,²⁰⁷ a view subsequently confirmed by the Court in a later case.²⁰⁸ In what is probably the most revealing case of his early twenty-first century jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy made clear in his *Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation* dissent that states’ rights were more important to him than environmental protection, at least when the latter

201. See *supra* notes 162–171 (discussing *United States v. Locke*, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)), notes 79–80 (discussing *Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n*, 505 U.S. 88 (1992)) and accompanying text.

202. See *supra* notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing *C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown*, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)).

203. *Alaska Dep’t of Env’tl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461, 516 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

204. A possible exception is Kennedy’s suggestion in his *Laidlaw* concurrence that congressionally authorized civil penalties in citizen suits might offend the Executive’s privileges under Article II of the Constitution. See *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’tl. Servs., Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 193, 197 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring), discussed *supra* notes 159–160 and accompanying text.

205. *United States v. Locke*, 529 U.S. 89, 105–16, discussed *supra* notes 161–171 and accompanying text.

206. *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606, 625–27 (2001), discussed *supra* notes 175–181.

207. *Id.* at 632, discussed *supra* note 183 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s refusal to conceptually sever *Palazzolo*’s wetlands from his uplands).

208. *Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency*, 535 U.S. 302, 326–327 & n.23 (2002) (endorsing the “parcel as a whole” rule and quoting from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in *Palazzolo* and Justice Brennan’s opinion in *Penn Central*).

involved more than one level of governmental regulation.²⁰⁹ This case shows that Kennedy's priority in doubtful cases is not environmental protection but preservation of state autonomy. And he is strident about it.²¹⁰

IV. DECISIONS OF 2005–06

In recent years, Justice Kennedy saw his view that the takings clause was an inappropriate vehicle for substantive challenges to governmental regulation vindicated by the Court.²¹¹ He also became the deciding vote both in the Court's affirmation of governmental authority to condemn land for economic development,²¹² and in its decision to limit regulation of wetlands not sufficiently connected to navigable waters,²¹³ although the latter decision raised many more questions than it answered.²¹⁴ In all of these cases, Kennedy's fidelity to fact-based decisionmaking remained evident.

A. *Lingle v. Chevron*

Of the two celebrated property rights cases of the 2004 Supreme Court term, *Lingle v. Chevron* received decidedly less press attention than *Kelo v. City of New London*, although it is not clear that the result is less significant. *Lingle* concerned a Hawaiian statute enacted in response to the state's highly concentrated gasoline market that produced extremely high consumer prices.²¹⁵ The statute capped the maximum rent an oil company could charge dealers leasing its service stations.²¹⁶ Chevron, one of only six wholesalers in the state, claimed the statute

209. See *Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461, 516–18 (2004), discussed *supra* notes 187–203 and accompanying text.

210. Professor Lazarus, *supra* note 198 at 250, observed that Kennedy's *Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation* dissent "relied on remarkably strident rhetoric." Lazarus suggested that Kennedy's dissent erred by not considering the reasons for congressional distrust of state regulation in the Clean Air Act: thus, "what Justice Kennedy perceived as a problem may have been better understood as a solution." *Id.* at 251.

211. See *Lingle v. Chevron*, 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005), discussed *infra* notes 215–226 and accompanying text.

212. See *Kelo v. New London*, 545 U.S. 469, 490–93 (2005), discussed *infra* notes 227–237 and accompanying text.

213. See *Rapanos v. United States*, __U.S.__ (June, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236–52 (2006), discussed *infra* notes 240–254 and accompanying text.

214. See, e.g., *infra* note 246 (discussing post-*Rapanos* cases).

215. *Lingle*, 544 U.S. at 533 (citing 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws page no. 257).

216. *Id.*

prevented it from recovering its expenses and failed to “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest,²¹⁷ a showing that the Supreme Court seemed to require the government to demonstrate in its 1980 *Agins v. Tiburon* decision.²¹⁸ Chevron challenged the regulation, the district court twice ruled in favor of the oil company, and the Ninth Circuit twice affirmed, all upholding the relevance of the “substantially advances” test.²¹⁹

Somewhat surprisingly, a unanimous Supreme Court repudiated the “substantially advances” test for regulatory takings.²²⁰ Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court denied that the test had any “proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”²²¹ The test’s focus on the effectiveness of a governmental regulation was, she maintained, actually a due process clause test, which was “logically prior to and distinct from” whether its effect produced too great a burden on an individual property holder.²²²

217. *See id.* at 534.

218. *See Agins v. City of Tiburon*, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (holding that a landowner’s takings claim failed because the ordinances at issue substantially advanced a legitimate state interest by protecting residents from the “ill effects” of urbanization).

219. After the district court initially ruled in Chevron’s favor, the state appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the “substantially advances” test. The appeals court affirmed on the appropriateness of the standard, although it remanded as to its application. *Chevron v. Cayetano*, 224 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court then concluded that the statute was unconstitutional by failing to advance a legitimate state interest, because the effect of the statute would be to actually increase gasoline prices, not lower them. The Ninth Circuit again affirmed, upholding the use of the “substantially advances” test. *Chevron v. Bronster*, 363 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2004).

220. *Lingle*, 544 U.S. at 540. Justice Kennedy had been complaining about the *Agins* “substantially advances” test as early as *Lucas*, when he argued in conference that the “*Agins* language is not correct and has to be explained.” *See Percival*, *supra* note 70, at 10,654–55 (citing Notes of Justice Blackmun (Feb. 29, 1992 & Mar. 1, 1992) Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 599).

221. *Lingle*, 544 U.S. at 540. The Court made an exception to the statement in the text for land use exactions, such as those involved in *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring a “rough proportionality” between the effect of proposed developments and requirements to dedicate land for public purposes), discussed *supra* notes 117–118.

According to Justice O’Connor, the purpose of regulatory takings jurisprudence is to identify regulatory actions that are “functionally equivalent” to physical takings of property by focusing on “the severity of the burden” the regulation imposes on private property. *Lingle*, 544 U.S. at 539.

222. *Id.* at 543. This conclusion vindicated longstanding arguments by John Echeverria. *See* John D. Echeverria, *Takings and Errors*, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2000) (criticizing the “substantially advances” test as the source of error in takings decisions, and analogizing the test to Due Process Clause means-ends analysis); John D. Echeverria, *Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?*, 29 ENVTL. L. 853 (1999) (arguing the “substantially advances” test has no place in takings analysis); John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, *The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion*, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 716 (1993) (arguing for the establishment of a new

Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence to emphasize that the Court's abandonment of the "substantially advances" test for a regulatory taking did not preclude the possibility that "a regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process," citing his *Eastern Enterprises* concurrence.²²³ His *Lingle* concurrence was a reminder that Kennedy—whose puzzling *Laidlaw* concurrence indicated an evident hostility to governmental control²²⁴—was more than willing to erect a new era of substantive due process review, in which federal courts would police the wisdom of local land use regulations. Justice Kennedy's apparent moderation in the takings context²²⁵ hardly seems evident outside that context.²²⁶ Upon close inspection, Kennedy seems more of a regulatory skeptic than a moderate.

B. *Kelo v. City of New London*

Far more celebrated (or notorious) than *Lingle* was the well-known *Kelo* decision, which inspired a widespread political revolt.²²⁷ *Kelo* involved the question of whether condemnation for private economic development can qualify as a public use. The city of New London, Connecticut—which had purchased most of the land necessary for a redevelopment project in an economically depressed area—decided to

takings standard distinct from due process analysis). For a detailed analysis of *Lingle* and its significance, see Robert G. Dreher, *Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process From Takings Doctrine*, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2006) (maintaining that by removing any substantive due process element from takings inquiries, *Lingle* heralded a new narrow vision of takings analysis).

223. *Lingle*, 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring). On his *Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), concurrence, see *supra* notes 103–104 and accompanying text.

224. See *supra* notes 159–160 and accompanying text.

225. See *supra* notes 174–186 (discussing *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)) and accompanying text.

226. See *supra* notes 187–203 (discussing *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)) and 215–225 (discussing *Lingle*, 544 U.S. 528) and accompanying text.

227. *Kelo v. City of New London*, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See Timothy Sandefur *The "Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?* 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709 (2006) (summarizing legislation passed in more than twenty states in response to *Kelo* to restrict eminent domain powers); Eric Claeys, *That '70s Show: Eminent Domain Reform and the Administrative Law Revolution*, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867 (2006) (urging states to amend eminent domain statutes to require heightened means-ends scrutiny); Bernard W. Bell, *Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers*, 32 J. LEGIS. 165 (2006) (discussing ways Congress could restrict states' ability to exercise eminent domain power); Charles E. Cohen, *Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings*, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2006) (calling on states to amend their constitutions to bar the use of eminent domain for economic development); see also *supra* note 6, discussing commentary about Justice Kennedy's role in *Kelo*.

condemn fifteen “holdout” properties as part of its plan to revitalize an ailing economy.²²⁸ Unlike most condemnations, however, much of the condemned land here would be used for private residential and commercial use, including a resort hotel and conference center.²²⁹

The holdouts filed suit in Connecticut court, challenging this use of the eminent domain authority. The trial court granted relief as to some parcels, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, ruling that all the condemnations were permissible public uses and in the public interest.²³⁰

A fractured Court upheld the city’s plan on a 5-4 vote.²³¹ The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, decided that the city’s determination that the neighborhood warranted an economic revitalization program deserved a high degree of judicial deference.²³² According to Justice Stevens, the city’s carefully considered development plan ensured that there would be no illegitimate taking of property from one owner to another without a public benefit.²³³

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supplied the deciding vote in the case.²³⁴ He did not share the majority’s position concerning deference to

228. Most of the properties necessary to carry out the city’s plan were acquired by purchase; only a few required condemnation. *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 475. The city was clearly authorized under state law to condemn land—even if it was already developed—for economic development if it were for a “public use” and in the “public interest.” *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 476 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 *et seq.* (2005)).

229. See Peggy Cosgrove, *New London Development Corporation* (prepared for the American Assembly), at 5, available at http://www.clairegaudiani.com/Writings/documents/NLDC_Case_Study.pdf.

230. *Kelo v. City of New London*, 843 A.2d 500, 527–28, 543 (Conn. 2004) (relying on *Berman v. Parker*, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding condemnation for urban redevelopment) and *Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff*, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding condemnation to break up a land oligopoly)).

231. *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 470.

232. *Id.* at 483.

233. *Id.* (“The City has carefully formulated a development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue”).

234. Justice O’Connor wrote for the four-member dissent that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. She thought the majority had taken her opinion in *Midkiff* (upholding the use of eminent domain to break up a land oligopoly) too far in authorizing eminent domain for economic development, “[since] nearly any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the public.” *Id.* at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). She would restrict its use to programs aimed at curing “public harms,” like blight (as in *Berman*) and land oligopoly (as in *Midkiff*). Without such limits, she predicted that “[t]he beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims,” she claimed that “the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more.” *Id.* at 505. Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent on originalist grounds. *Id.* (Thomas, J., dissenting).

the city; instead he suggested the need for heightened judicial scrutiny of certain declarations of public use to guard against condemnations that “favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”²³⁵ In cases of possible impermissible favoritism to private parties, Kennedy called for “a careful and extensive inquiry” into whether the development plan would satisfy what amounted to a seven-factor test.²³⁶ This fact-intensive inquiry seemed to be an effort to transform the minimum scrutiny advocated by the plurality into something approaching intermediate judicial scrutiny—what Kennedy referred to as “meaningful rational basis review.”²³⁷ The result was consistent with his interest in reviving substantive due process review, evidenced in *Apfel*,²³⁸ and his fidelity to fact-based determinations, epitomized in *Coeur d’Alene*,²³⁹ among other opinions.

C. *Rapanos v. United States*

The final decision in this study was the most closely watched environmental law case of the Court’s 2005 term. Again, Justice Kennedy supplied the deciding vote. The controversy concerned two cases involving four Michigan wetlands, all lying near ditches or man-made drains that emptied into traditionally navigable waters. In one case, the government brought an enforcement action against a developer who filled without a permit;²⁴⁰ in the other, the government denied the developer a permit.²⁴¹ In both cases, different district courts concluded that there was federal jurisdiction over the fills.²⁴² The Sixth Circuit affirmed because one of the cases involved wetlands “adjacent” to

235. *Id.* at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

236. *Id.* at 491–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (calling for investigation as to whether 1) the primary beneficiaries of the plan were the developer and private businesses; 2) there were more than incidental benefits to the city; 3) there was evidence of depressed economic conditions; 4) there was a substantial commitment of public funds before identifying most of the private beneficiaries; 5) the government reviewed several alternative development plans; 6) the government selected the developer from a variety of competitors, not one identified beforehand; and 7) the private beneficiaries were identified beforehand).

237. *Id.* at 492. Kennedy suggested that the trigger for this more stringent standard of review was when the “risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.” *Id.* at 493.

238. *See supra* notes 104–106 and accompanying text.

239. *See supra* notes 87–100 and accompanying text.

240. *See United States v. Rapanos*, 376 F.3d 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2004).

241. *See Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 391 F.3d 704, 705–07 (6th Cir. 2004).

242. *See Carabell*, 391 F.3d at 707; *Rapanos*, 376 F.3d at 634.

navigable waters, and the other involved a wetland that had a hydrological connection to a navigable water.²⁴³

A divided Supreme Court split 4-1-4. Characteristically, Justice Kennedy was the pivotal vote. Justice Scalia's opinion for a four-member plurality would have swept away thirty years of consistent Clean Water Act (CWA) interpretation, relying on a 1954 dictionary to conclude that federal jurisdiction was restricted to "those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water 'forming

243. *Carabell*, 391 F.3d at 709–10 (affirming a lower court decision upholding a Corps decision not to grant a permit to fill a wetland that was adjacent to a tributary to navigable waters); *Rapanos*, 376 F.3d at 629 (affirming the district court decision that held that a developer was required to apply for a permit to fill several wetlands).

Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), landowners are prohibited from discharging fill into the "navigable waters" without first obtaining a permit from the Corps. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). For the purposes of the CWA, "navigable waters" include a much greater scope of waters than navigable-in-fact waterways, as the CWA defines the term to encompass "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). And, the statute's legislative history indicated that the term should be construed to the fullest extent of federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction. *See* S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-1236 at 2 (1972), *reprinted in* 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3821 (amending the original Senate bill to define the term "navigable waters"); S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 2 (1971), *reprinted in* 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3773 (calling for enlarging the federal role in water pollution control to include navigable waters, groundwater, and waters of the contiguous zone).

The Corps and EPA issued substantively identical longstanding regulations defining the scope of "waters of the United States" for purposes of CWA jurisdiction to include: "(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; (2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands; (3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce . . . (4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under the definition; (5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section; (6) The territorial seas; (7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this section." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006) (the Corps' regulations); *see also* 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2007) (the EPA regulations).

These regulations have been the source of a number of recent challenges to the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands, most notably in *Solid Waste Agency of Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers*, (*SWANCC*), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), where the Supreme Court invalidated Corps' jurisdiction over so-called "isolated" waters that provide habitat for migratory birds (the Migratory Bird Rule). *Id.* at 174. Lower courts have split over how broadly the holding in *SWANCC* applies. The Fifth Circuit narrowly construed the scope of Corps' jurisdiction by requiring findings that a wetland is "truly" adjacent to a jurisdictional water. *See In re Needham*, 354 F.3d 340, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2003). Other circuits interpreted *SWANCC* to have no limiting effect on Corps' wetlands jurisdiction beyond invalidating the Migratory Bird Rule. *See Rapanos*, 376 F.3d at 638. As the Sixth Circuit noted in *Carabell*, *SWANCC* did not overrule the Supreme Court's earlier decision upholding Corps' jurisdiction over "adjacent wetlands" in *United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.*, 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985). *See Carabell*, 391 F.3d at 709.

geographic features' that are described in ordinary parlance as 'streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.'"²⁴⁴ This interpretation would have precluded federal regulation of intermittent or ephemeral bodies of water that are not permanent or continuously flowing—characteristic of many Western streams—in the service of the plurality's view of protecting state and local authority allegedly threatened by federal CWA jurisdiction.²⁴⁵

But, Justice Kennedy—whose opinion was controlling, as Chief Justice Roberts made clear²⁴⁶—was unwilling to rely on a half-century old dictionary to resolve such an important question of federal jurisdiction. Instead, he concluded that the Sixth Circuit correctly determined that a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction if it possessed a "significant nexus" to navigable waters, but that the appeals court had failed to consider all the factors necessary to ascertain whether the wetland in fact had the requisite nexus.²⁴⁷ Kennedy claimed that "in most cases regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and

244. *Rapanos v. United States*, __ U.S. __ (June, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2225 (2006) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. *See id.* at 2214.

245. *Id.* at 2225.

246. *Id.* at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that "[l]ower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis," but "[t]his situation is certainly not unprecedented" under *Marks v. United States*, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . .'" (quoting *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Lower courts are now wrestling with what to make of the rule in *Rapanos*.

One of the first post-*Rapanos* district courts to reach a wetlands jurisdictional determination interpreted the fragmented decision to indicate that courts should find Corps' jurisdiction if a wetland meets either Kennedy's "significant nexus" standard or the plurality's "continuous surface connection" test. *See United States v. Evans*, No. 3:05CR159J32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *20–21 (M.D. Fla. 2006). The First Circuit agreed in *United States v. Johnson*, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2006) (either the *Rapanos* plurality's test or Kennedy's test is sufficient for federal jurisdiction). But, both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits upheld federal jurisdiction based only on Kennedy's test. *N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg*, 457 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test to determine jurisdiction over a pond adjacent to a river, but finding that "nexus" in the form of a surface connection between water seeping over a man-made levee from the pond into the river); *United States v. Gerke Excavating*, 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (employing Kennedy's test as "the least common denominator," because the court thought it would be a "rare case" where the *Rapanos* plurality and dissent would both find jurisdiction but Justice Kennedy would not).

247. *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist first brought the phrase "significant nexus" into the Court's wetlands jurisprudence when he wrote in his *SWANCC* opinion that "[i]t was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that informed our reading of the CWA in *Riverside Bayview Homes*." *SWANCC*, 531 U.S. at 167.

possess a significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no serious constitutional or federalism difficulty,” adding that “[t]he possibility of legitimate Commerce Clause and federalism concerns in some circumstances does not require the adoption of an interpretation that departs in all cases from the Act’s text and structure.”²⁴⁸

Kennedy’s concurrence had much more in common with Justice Stevens’s dissent, which called for judicial deference to longstanding and reasonable administrative practice, than with the plurality.²⁴⁹ Kennedy even referred to the plurality opinion as “inconsistent with the Act’s text, structure and purpose,” a rather curious conclusion in a concurrence.²⁵⁰ He spelled out the “significant nexus” test he called for in the following terms:

[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase “navigable waters,” if the wetlands either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as “navigable.” When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term “navigable waters.”²⁵¹

248. *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. at 2249–50. Kennedy seemed to have exempted wetlands adjacent to navigable waters from his “significant nexus” showing: “As applied to wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’ conclusive standard for jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable inference ecologic interconnection, and the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the Act by showing adjacency alone. That is the holding of *Riverside Bayview*.” *Id.* at 2248. However, a Ninth Circuit panel recently ruled that adjacency of wetlands to navigable waters is no longer sufficient to justify CWA jurisdiction. The panel interpreted *Rapanos* to narrow the scope of the Court’s *Riverside Bayview* decision. The court instead required a showing of a “significant nexus” between the adjacent wetlands and traditionally navigable waters. *N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg*, 457 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2006).

249. *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. at 2252–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote for himself and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. *Id.* at 2252.

250. *Id.* at 2246. Moreover, Kennedy noted that because “the dissent is correct to observe that an intermittent flow can constitute a stream, . . . [i]t follows that the Corps can reasonably interpret the Act to cover the paths of such impermanent streams.” *Id.* at 2243. Also, he observed that the plurality’s conclusion that navigable waters may not be intermittent was “unsound.” *Id.* at 2243. And, he agreed with the dissent that “the fact that point sources may carry continuous flow undermines the plurality’s conclusion that covered ‘waters’ under the Act may not be discontinuous.” *Id.* at 2243. Finally, he rejected the plurality’s exclusion of wetlands lacking a continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional waters. *Id.* at 2244. *See also* Donald Kennedy & Brook Hanson, *What’s a Wetland, Anyway?*, 313 *SCIENCE* no. 5790, at 1019 (Aug. 25, 2006) (criticizing Justice Scalia for looking to a dictionary, rather than to contemporary environmental science—as Justice Kennedy did—in ascertaining the scope of federal wetlands jurisdiction in *Rapanos*).

251. *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. at 2248.

Kennedy faulted existing Corps' regulations for their "overbreadth" and called for new regulations concerning wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters, to ensure the requisite ecological connection.²⁵² Pending the promulgation of such regulations, the Corps would have to make jurisdictional determinations on a case-by-case basis.²⁵³

Kennedy did not conclude that the wetlands at issue in *Rapanos* were beyond regulatory reach. In fact, he suggested that they were probably jurisdictional wetlands, noting that "the record contains evidence suggesting the possible existence of a significant nexus according to the principles outlined above. Thus the end result in these cases and many others to be considered by the Corps may be the same as that suggested by the dissent."²⁵⁴ Why, in light of these sentiments, Kennedy concurred in the plurality opinion was not at all clear.

D. Kennedy's Environmental Record, 2005–06

Justice Kennedy's recent decisions should come as no surprise to those carefully studying his environmental record. His view that the takings clause should not be invoked to question the substantive merits of legislation, first articulated in *Eastern Enterprises*,²⁵⁵ finally prevailed in *Lingle*, as the Court reversed itself unanimously.²⁵⁶ In both *Kelo* and *Rapanos*, Kennedy's concurrences were outcome determinative for a fractured Court. Characteristically, in *Kelo*, he called for a multi-factor test to determine the validity of condemnations for economic development.²⁵⁷ In *Rapanos*, he wanted the government to show the

252. *Id.* at 2248–49 (calling for the Corps "to identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow (either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable waters.") He specifically approved the Corps' existing regulations concerning wetlands adjacent to navigable waters because there was "a reasonable inference of ecological interconnection" with navigable waters. *Id.* at 2248.

253. *Id.* at 2249.

254. *Id.* at 2250. See Bradford C. Mank, *Implementing Rapanos—Will Justice Kennedy's Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators, and Developers?*, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 348 (2007) (predicting that the significant nexus test will only modestly affect the scope of federal jurisdiction because of its emphasis on ecological considerations, not merely hydrological connections).

255. *E. Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498, 542, 547–49 (1998), discussed *supra* notes 101–106 and accompanying text.

256. See *Lingle v. Chevron*, 544 U.S. 528, 540, 543 (2005), discussed *supra* notes 215–226 and accompanying text.

257. See *Kelo v. City of New London*, 545 U.S. 469, 491–92 (2005), discussed *supra* notes 234–

existence of a significant ecological nexus between wetlands and navigable waters as a predicate for federal regulation.²⁵⁸ Such fact-intensive inquiries are, of course, a Kennedy trademark.

V. THE KENNEDY PROFILE

The chronology above illustrates Justice Kennedy's essential role in environmental cases in the twenty-first century. In the twelve years between 1988 and 2000, Kennedy wrote only nine opinions, or just .75 per year.²⁵⁹ In the six years since 2000, Kennedy wrote eight environmental law decisions, or 1.3 per year, an increase of roughly seventy-five percent.²⁶⁰ Moreover, Kennedy's role is increasingly determinative: of the twenty post-2000 decisions examined in this study, five were decided on 5-4 votes, and Kennedy was in the majority in all but one.²⁶¹ And, of course, Kennedy has written only one environmental dissent.²⁶²

But, this chronological presentation, while useful in understanding the development of Justice Kennedy's thinking and in illustrating his growing importance to the Court's environmental law decisionmaking, may fail to capture the contributions Justice Kennedy's opinions have made in discrete areas of environmental law. The four areas to which he has most prominently contributed are 1) standing and ripeness, 2)

237.

258. See *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. at 1236, 2248–50, discussed *supra* notes 247–254 and accompanying text.

259. See *supra* §§ III–IV.

260. See *supra* §§ IV–V.

261. See *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606, 610 (2001) (writing for a majority that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, and which Justice Stevens also joined in part); *Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 531 U.S. 159, 161 (2001) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority, which was also joined by Justices Thomas, Scalia, and O'Connor); *Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 471 (filing a concurring opinion and joining Justice Stevens's majority opinion, which was also joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer); and *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. at 2214 (concurring in the judgment, but filing a separate concurring opinion from the plurality authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas). Justice Kennedy's pivotal role in wetlands cases can be also deduced from the 4-4 result in a California wetlands case from which he had recused himself. *Borden Ranch v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs*, 537 U.S. 99, 100 (2002) (affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision that EPA had jurisdiction to enforce the CWA when a developer engaged in "deep ripping"—intensive and very deep plowing through water features—without a permit on a former ranch with numerous water and wetland features, although that jurisdiction did not extend to vernal pools, which the Ninth Circuit determined to be "isolated" wetlands of the type exempted from CWA jurisdiction in *SWANCC*, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).

262. *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461, 502 (2004), discussed *supra* notes 187–203 and accompanying text.

states'-rights federalism, 3) takings, and 4) environmental statutory interpretation. This section discusses each subject area in turn.

A. *Standing and Ripeness*

Three standing cases figure prominently in Kennedy's environmental portfolio: his concurrences in *Defenders* and *Laidlaw* and his majority opinion in *Del Monte Dunes*.²⁶³ In *Defenders*, one of Justice Kennedy's more telling early opinions, he was unwilling to join in Justice Scalia's dismissive treatment of the plaintiffs' "animal and vocational nexus" theories of standing, reserving the right to consider them at a later date, under other facts.²⁶⁴ He also rejected the Scalian proposition that Congress could not establish standing for new causes of action.²⁶⁵

In *Del Monte Dunes*, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion rejected the application of the more stringent "rough proportionality" test employed in exaction cases, but upheld the lower court's submission of the takings claim to a jury.²⁶⁶ And, his odd concurrence in *Laidlaw* suggested that citizen suits might violate the executive prerogatives contained in Article II of the Constitution.²⁶⁷ The Kennedy standing record is thus a mixed bag—as is the Court's record in general²⁶⁸—perhaps reflecting his reaction to the substantive merits of the underlying environmental claim. His intimation in *Laidlaw* about possible limits on Congress's ability to authorize civil penalties in citizen suits to protect the Executive's Article II powers has to be of considerable concern for environmental plaintiffs.²⁶⁹

Kennedy's chief ripeness decision was *Palazzolo*, in which his majority opinion concluded that rejection of the landowner's repeated

263. See *supra* notes 69–77 (*Defenders*), 159–160, (*Laidlaw*), 107–123 (*Del Monte Dunes*) and accompanying text.

264. See *supra* notes 70–71 and accompanying text.

265. See *supra* notes 72–74 and accompanying text.

266. See *supra* notes 116–123 and accompanying text.

267. See *supra* notes 159–160 and accompanying text.

268. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. *The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights*, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 663–70 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's use of standing in decisions as a way to avoid undesired remedies); David N. Cassuto, *The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms*, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 79, 85 (2004) (arguing for a fundamental shift in standing jurisprudence which recognizes potential injury to the environment as a foundation for standing); Zachary D. Sakas, *Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split Regarding Standing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges*, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175, 180–86 (2006) (discussing trends in the Court's environmental standing cases).

269. See *supra* note 159 and accompanying text.

development applications indicated that the state was unlikely to ever approve his proposed development, and therefore the takings claim was ripe.²⁷⁰ Kennedy's *Del Monte Dunes* majority decision did not disturb a lower court decision that found the city's numerous denials of a beach development to be ripe.²⁷¹ He clearly is quite interested in removing ripeness burdens to landowners who submit numerous proposals to local governments and claim that repeated governmental rejections work takings.²⁷²

Kennedy appears to be fairly evenhanded in his standing and ripeness decisions. While opposed to setting high hurdles for landowners claiming takings, he does not adhere to the Scalian common law model.²⁷³ He is willing to entertain animal and vocational nexus theories of standing,²⁷⁴ and he believes that Congress has the authority to define injuries and chains of causation sufficient for standing.²⁷⁵ Although he has raised questions about civil penalties in citizen suits as possibly unconstitutionally interfering with the Executive's Article II prerogatives,²⁷⁶ he seems largely committed to allowing both landowners and citizen enforcers to have their day in court.²⁷⁷

B. States' Rights Federalism

Justice Kennedy's interest in federalism is considerably greater than his interest in environmental protection.²⁷⁸ But, his record is a mixed one. His early concurrence in *Gade* supplied the deciding vote to

270. See *supra* note 178 and accompanying text.

271. *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687, 722 (1999) (noting the "shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city" as an example of the "unreasonable government action" the developer used as the basis of the takings claim). See *supra* note 112 and accompanying text.

272. See *supra* note 178.

273. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, *Greening the Constitution: Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values*, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 869–70 (2002) (discussing Kennedy's *Defenders* concurrence as a departure from "Scalia's restrictive views of standing"); Sunstein, *What's Standing After Lujan?*, *supra* note 24 at 201 (discussing how Kennedy's *Defenders* concurrence recognized congressional ability to articulate causes of action not found in the common law); Farber, *supra* note 77 at 566 n.89 (noting Kennedy demonstrated that he was receptive to recognizing public values embodied in environmental statutes in both *Lucas* and *Defenders*).

274. See *supra* note 70 and accompanying text (discussing *Defenders*).

275. See *supra* note 73 and accompanying text (discussing *Defenders*).

276. See *supra* note 159 and accompanying text (discussing *Laidlaw*).

277. See *supra* notes 71–73, 178, and accompanying text (discussing *Defenders* and *Palazzolo*).

278. See *supra* note 20 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's limitations on the federal commerce power and the Eleventh Amendment revolution during the mid-1990s).

preempt an Illinois hazardous waste-worker training statute, apparently viewing the avoidance of dual regulation as a higher priority than preserving state police power.²⁷⁹ This concurrence advocated a broader preemption—based on the text of the statute—than the conflict preemption endorsed by Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion.²⁸⁰ Similarly, Kennedy's majority opinion in *Locke* preempted Washington state tanker safety regulations not on the basis of federal-state conflicts but on his interpretation of federal policy.²⁸¹

Kennedy's first environmental law decision for the Court, *Carbone*, was also surprising for a professed states' rights advocate.²⁸² He viewed the town of Clarkstown's ordinance, aimed at promoting recycling, as a protectionist measure that interfered with the flow of interstate commerce, not as a measure aimed at managing the town's waste problems.²⁸³ This perception led this professed states' rights defender to conclude that the local recycling ordinance substantially interfered with his expansive notion of the dormant federal commerce power.²⁸⁴

These surprising decisions favoring federal hegemony stand in contrast to the more prototypical Kennedy states' rights position exemplified in his 1997 *Coeur d'Alene Tribe* majority opinion, in which he broadly interpreted state immunity from suits and read narrowly an apparently relevant exemption from this liability.²⁸⁵ His endorsement of case-by-case balancing concerning the applicability of state Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal suits was not shared by Justice O'Connor, who thought that federal jurisdiction should not be premised on judicial balancing of federal versus state interests in suits seeking prospective relief.²⁸⁶ Kennedy's unsympathetic approach to tribal property issues was again evident two years later, when his opinion for the Court rejected the Southern Ute Tribe's claim to coalbed methane gas reserves.²⁸⁷ In so doing, he ignored interpretative rules favoring

279. See *supra* note 80 and accompanying text.

280. See *supra* note 79.

281. See *supra* notes 161–171.

282. See *supra* note 19 (states' rights advocate), notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing *Carbone*).

283. See *supra* notes 85–86 and accompanying text.

284. See *supra* note 86.

285. *Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe*, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), discussed *supra* notes 87–100 and accompanying text.

286. See *supra* note 98 and accompanying text.

287. *Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Tribe*, 526 U.S. 865 (1999), discussed *supra* notes 130–137 and accompanying text. While *Amoco* does not directly address states' rights, it nonetheless reflects Kennedy's attitudes toward federalism. Although not parties to the suit, western states stood to lose

tribes and federal retention of public resources in favor of what he viewed as a “natural interpretation” of the definition of coal from ninety years earlier.²⁸⁸ And, Kennedy’s states’ rights perspective dominated the only environmental dissent he wrote, as he overlooked the text of the Clean Air Act and deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the statute in favor of promoting his vision of an active state role in environmental policy.²⁸⁹

Kennedy’s states’ rights federalism is certainly a hallmark of his jurisprudence,²⁹⁰ but his states’-rights philosophy has clear bounds. He is more than willing to preempt state statutes, even where they do not directly conflict with federal law.²⁹¹ And, his broad interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause allowed him to strike down a recycling ordinance as protectionist in *Carbone*, even though the restrictions imposed by the ordinance were felt more in-state than out-of-state.²⁹² On the other hand, Kennedy’s states’ rights pedigree was evident in his expansive view of state immunity from federal suit in *Coeur d’Alene Tribe*.²⁹³ He also overlooked both federal land and Indian law canons of interpretation in rejecting the Southern Ute Tribe’s claims to coalbed methane gas, in an anti-federal, if not a states’ rights opinion.²⁹⁴ And, his interpretation of the Clean Air Act would have effectively allowed a state to displace federal action.²⁹⁵ So, although Kennedy is a card-carrying member of the states’ rights club, he has shown a proclivity to

considerable tax revenue if the Tenth Circuit’s holding in favor of the tribe was upheld. The states of Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming submitted an amicus brief to the Court in support of the oil company, emphasizing the hardship the states would experience if they were to lose tax revenue collected from the oil companies. Brief for the State of Mont. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, *Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Tribe*, 526 U.S. 865 (1999) (1999 WL 115533).

288. See *supra* notes 135–136 and accompanying text.

289. *Alaska Dep’t of Envtl Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed *supra* notes 187–203 and accompanying text.

290. Among Kennedy’s states’-rights contributions was his deciding vote in *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a non-environmental decision striking down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond the power of the Commerce Clause, the first time in sixty years the Court found a federal statute to exceed the commerce power. Kennedy’s concurrence (joined by Justice O’Connor) emphasized that gun possession lacked commercial character and that neither the purposes nor the design of the statute had a “commercial nexus.” *Id.* at 580.

291. See *supra* notes 161–171 and accompanying text (discussing *Locke*).

292. See *supra* notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s *Carbone* opinion).

293. See *supra* notes 88–100 and accompanying text (discussing *Coeur d’Alene Tribe*).

294. See *supra* notes 124–137 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s *S. Ute Tribe* opinion).

295. See *supra* note 194–203 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s dissent in *Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation*).

dispense with state police power where not doing so might produce dual regulation.

C. Takings

The aggressiveness evident in Justice Kennedy's standing and federalism opinions is not very apparent in his approach to takings, which instead has been characterized by moderation. In *Lucas*, he refused to join Justice Scalia's effort to erect a significant categorical takings rule, opting instead in a concurrence for a litmus test grounded on reasonable landowner expectations that could account for changed conditions, new ecological understandings, and protection of what he termed "fragile lands."²⁹⁶ This sort of fact-intensive inquiry is characteristic of Kennedy's takings jurisprudence.²⁹⁷

A fidelity to factual analysis also helps to explain Justice Kennedy's concurrence in *Eastern Enterprises*, in which he refused to apply a takings analysis concerning apparently retroactive legislation, choosing instead to conclude that the statute failed to satisfy substantive due process.²⁹⁸ Kennedy reiterated his desire to employ substantive due process analysis in his *Lingle* concurrence.²⁹⁹ This willingness to employ substantive due process to review the wisdom of legislation echoed the distrust of Congress reflected in his suggestion in *Laidlaw* that congressionally authorized civil penalties in citizen suits might intrude on the Executive's Article II powers.³⁰⁰

Kennedy's interest in ensuring that landowners get their day in court motivated his ripeness ruling in *Palazzolo*,³⁰¹ when he eliminated the so-called "notice rule" that gave governments a categorical defense against takings claims, referring to the government as Hobbesian.³⁰² He also

296. *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n*, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), discussed *supra* notes 54–65 and accompanying text.

297. See *supra* note 64 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's affinity for fact-specific analysis).

298. *E. Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498, 549 (1998), discussed *supra* notes 104–106 and accompanying text.

299. *Lingle v. Chevron*, 544 U.S. 528, 548–49 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see *supra* note 223 and accompanying text.

300. *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see *supra* notes 159–160 and accompanying text.

301. See *supra* notes 172–186 and accompanying text.

302. *Palazzolo v. Rhode Island*, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001); see *supra* note 179 and accompanying text. Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher who wrote *Leviathan* in 1651, which suggests that man may avoid destructive wars through social contracts that establish governments as absolute authorities. According to the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Hobbesian refers to the theory

approved jury determinations of takings claims in *Del Monte Dunes*, while refusing to apply a “rough proportionality” test outside the exactions area.³⁰³

Another Kennedy concurrence supplied the decisive vote in *Kelo*, ratifying public use takings for economic development.³⁰⁴ But, he objected to the plurality’s call for great judicial deference to the city’s redevelopment plan, calling for a “careful and extensive inquiry” to ensure that the public benefits were substantial and the private benefits incidental.³⁰⁵ This sort of fact-based scrutiny is, of course, familiar.³⁰⁶

Kennedy’s commitment to contextualism is quite evident in the takings cases. In *Lucas*, he opposed categorical decisionmaking because it was not sensitive to changes in ecological understandings and fragile lands.³⁰⁷ Factual analysis was also central to his acceptance of eminent domain for economic development³⁰⁸ and for determining whether a regulation “substantively advance[d]” a public purpose, a test he convinced the Court was more appropriate for substantive due process than takings analysis.³⁰⁹ He also wrote the Court’s opinion approving juries as determiners of whether the application of a regulation to a property produces a taking.³¹⁰ On the other hand, Kennedy refused to approve a categorical taking rule in *Del Monte Dunes*,³¹¹ and his conception of the scope of the exception to the categorical rule created in *Lucas* was much more expansive than Justice Scalia’s.³¹² Thus, while Kennedy may sympathize with the Lockean landowner confronted by the Hobbesian state,³¹³ he is unwilling to side with the landowner categorically.

that “absolutism in government is necessary to prevent the warfare of each against all to which natural selfishness inevitably leads mankind.” WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544 (1973).

303. *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.*, 526 U.S. 687 (1998); see *supra* notes 107–122 and accompanying text.

304. *Kelo v. City of New London*, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

305. See *supra* note 236 and accompanying text.

306. See, e.g., *supra* notes 246–254, *infra* notes 307–310, 318 and accompanying text.

307. See *supra* note 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing *Lucas*).

308. See *supra* note 235–237 and accompanying text (discussing *Kelo*).

309. See *supra* notes 104–106 and accompanying text (discussing *Apfel*), notes 215–226 and accompanying text (discussing *Lingle*).

310. See *supra* notes 119–122 and accompanying text (discussing *Del Monte Dunes*).

311. See *supra* note 117 and accompanying text (rejecting application of the *Dolan* “rough proportionality” rule).

312. See *supra* notes 58 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s concurrence in *Lucas*).

313. See *supra* note 179 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy’s opinion in *Palazzolo*).

D. Environmental Statutory Interpretation

Justice Kennedy's review of environmental legislation is probably best characterized as indifferent. He has written only a couple of influential opinions: his sole environmental dissent and the deciding opinion in the 2006 wetlands case. In *Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation*, Kennedy's dissent objected to the federal EPA effectively overturning the state's interpretation of "best available control technology" under the Clean Air Act.³¹⁴ He seemed especially concerned that under the EPA's—and the majority's—interpretation, both the federal and state governments could actively enforce the statute simultaneously, inconsistent with his understanding of cooperative federalism.³¹⁵ But because simultaneous enforcement by the federal and state governments has long characterized implementation of environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act,³¹⁶ Kennedy's complaint seemed more appropriate for a legislator than a judge.

The wetlands case, *Rapanos*, concerning the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, appeared to animate Justice Kennedy, who again supplied the pivotal vote.³¹⁷ Quite predictably, although he thought the Corps of Engineers' regulations were overbroad, his solution was individualized fact-finding to establish a "significant nexus" between the wetland at issue and navigable waters.³¹⁸ Although this search may impose considerable administrative burdens on the regulatory agencies, the workability of Kennedy's nexus requirement was not his concern.

Although there are not many Kennedy environmental statutory interpretations, those that exist reinforce Kennedy's commitment to state autonomy, which is clearly more important to him than administrative deference or environmental protection.³¹⁹ Also reinforced was perhaps

314. *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation v. EPA*, 540 U.S. 461, 502–03 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

315. See *supra* notes 194–197 and accompanying text.

316. See, e.g., Joel Mintz, *The Future of Environmental Enforcement: A Reply to Paddock*, 21 ENVTL. L. 1543 (1991) (arguing that federal-state enforcement provisions will continue to rely on federal enforcement); Robert L. Glicksman, *From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy*, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 777 (2006) (discussing the ways in which the Supreme Court has narrowed enforcement of federal environmental laws in recent years).

317. See *supra* notes 247, 251, 254 and accompanying text (discussing *Rapanos v. United States*, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).

318. *Rapanos*, 126 S. Ct. at 2248–50.

319. See *supra* notes 194–203 and accompanying text (discussing *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation*).

the overarching theme of Kennedy's jurisprudence: a commitment to judicial factual inquiry in the form of a search for nexus.³²⁰

CONCLUSION

This study reveals Justice Anthony Kennedy to be a jurist skeptical of sweeping doctrinal changes and attached to incremental case-by-case decisionmaking, in which judges are entrusted with balancing tests and charged with explaining the connection between doctrine and context. Kennedy may be a doctrinal minimalist, but he is not a judicial minimalist: he possesses considerable faith in the judiciary's ability to balance factors like environmental protection, economic profit, and individual liberty.

Kennedy's willingness to entertain nexus theories of citizen standing and his acknowledgment of congressionally-created standing³²¹ reflect his commitment to judicial decisionmaking, although he has questioned the constitutionality of citizen suits under Article II.³²² On the other hand, he is impatient with government allegations that landowners' takings claims are not ripe.³²³ He is eager for takings claimants to have their day in court, and he is willing to have juries decide takings cases.³²⁴

Kennedy's devotion to case-by-case balancing was evident in his rejection of the "notice rule," which had given government defendants in takings cases a categorical defense prior to his *Palazzolo* opinion.³²⁵ He was also skeptical of the breadth of the categorical takings doctrine Justice Scalia announced in *Lucas*. Kennedy instead called for a broad exception to categorical takings that would consider contextual factors like changed conditions and sensitive lands.³²⁶ Such factors can also be balanced in substantive due process analysis, which Kennedy has sought to revive as a partial antidote to an expanded takings doctrine.³²⁷

320. See *supra* notes 246–254 and accompanying text (discussing *Rapanos*).

321. See *supra* notes 70–73 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's *Defenders* concurrence).

322. See *supra* notes 159–160 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's *Laidlaw* concurrence).

323. See *supra* note 178 and accompanying text (discussing *Palazzolo*).

324. See *supra* notes 119–123 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's majority opinion in *Del Monte Dunes*, upholding the lower court's decision to submit a takings claim to a jury).

325. See *supra* notes 179–181 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's rejection of the "notice rule" barring takings claims where a landowner acquired the property after the restrictive rule was in place as sufficient to defeat a takings claim in *Palazzolo*).

326. See *supra* notes 54–65 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's *Lucas* concurrence).

327. See *supra* notes 103–104 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's *Apfel* concurrence).

Kennedy is a determined states' rights enthusiast, a vital participant in the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution.³²⁸ He rejected Indian tribal land claims in favor of a broad application of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,³²⁹ and the only environmental dissent he has written was the product of his fidelity to states' rights: Kennedy thought that the federal EPA should not overrule the state of Alaska's regulatory decisions, despite statutory text apparently authorizing just that.³³⁰ Yet his *Carbone* decision showed him willing to invalidate a local recycling ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds,³³¹ and he was quick to preempt Washington tanker safety and Illinois hazardous waste worker-training laws.³³² Kennedy's devotion to states' rights apparently does not extend to what he considers to be overregulation: while he prefers state regulation to federal regulation, he prefers one level of regulation to two, and the market to regulation. His states' rights advocacy may actually be part of a larger deregulatory preference.

But, while Kennedy favors less regulation, he is not interested in dismantling all regulation. That is clear from his pivotal *Rapanos* concurrence, where he refused to agree with the plurality's effort to categorically scale back Clean Water Act jurisdiction, instead (and quite characteristically) opting for case-by-case determinations of the relationship between wetlands and navigable waters.³³³ He also approved economic development condemnations in his deciding *Kelo* concurrence, although characteristically he would have established a detailed fact-based inquiry to ascertain that the condemnation was not for impermissible private gain without public benefit.³³⁴

suggesting a revival of substantive due process analysis for evaluating retroactive legislation, rather than the takings clause) and *supra* notes 223–224 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's *Lingle* concurrence again articulating a willingness to revive substantive due process review).

328. *See supra* notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution).

329. *See supra* notes 94–100 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's opinion refusing to apply the *Ex Parte Young* exception to allow a suit filed by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's to proceed against the state of Idaho).

330. *See supra* notes 194–203 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's dissent in *Alaska Dep't of Env'tl. Conservation*).

331. *See supra* notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing the *Carbone* decision).

332. *See supra* notes 164–171 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in *Locke*), notes 78–80 (discussing *Gade*).

333. *See supra* notes 247–254 and accompanying text (discussing the *Rapanos* concurrence).

334. *See supra* notes 234–237 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in *Kelo*).

Whether Justice Kennedy's recent endorsement of environmental regulation is indicative of a trend is hardly clear. But, as long ago as 1992, he was fashioning rules to protect sensitive lands and to account for unforeseen changes.³³⁵ He is certainly not as sensitive to environmental protection as he is to fact-based decisionmaking, states' rights, or minimal regulation.³³⁶ But, he is not reflexively anti-regulation. Because of his devotion to private property rights,³³⁷ perhaps the best way to characterize Justice Kennedy is as someone who, while not dismissive of environmental regulation, will subject it to hard-look judicial review. The architects of hard-look review would not likely have anticipated its application against environmental regulation,³³⁸ but that may well portend its future in the Roberts Court.

At the end of the day, Justice Kennedy seems to be Holmesian in several respects. Like Justice Holmes,³³⁹ he is a devoted case-by-case balancer. He is also skeptical of regulatory improvement,³⁴⁰ but he is

335. See *supra* notes 54–61 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's *Lucas* concurrence, which recognized that changed conditions and ecological concerns may frustrate some takings claims and justify land use regulations).

336. See Cannon, *supra* note 7 (noting that Kennedy voted for the position benefiting the environment just 34.1 percent of the time in environmental cases).

337. See *supra* note 26 and accompanying text (discussing extrajudicial remarks Kennedy has made in support of private property rights).

338. Hard-look judicial review emerged during the 1970s when the D.C. Circuit, in response to a substantial increase in administrative law cases, began to emphasize review of the substance of agency decisions, not merely the procedure. See Reuel Schiller, *Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s*, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1156 (2001) (describing the advent of hard-look review in D.C. Circuit Judge Leventhal's opinion in *Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC*, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970)); see also Harold Leventhal, *Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts*, 122 U. PENN. L. REV. 509, 555 (1974) (advocating that courts subject federal agency environmental decisions to "hard look" in order to ensure "the principled integration and balanced assessment of both environmental and nonenvironmental considerations in federal agency decisionmaking"); Abraham Chayes, *The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation*, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (discussing the emergence of "public law litigation"—civil disputes over constitutional or statutory questions, rather than private party litigation—and the development of a more active judicial role in such cases).

339. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., *The Path of the Law*, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) ("I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundations of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious . . ."). See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, *THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960*, at 131 (1992) (attributing to Holmes' article, *Privilege, Malice and Intent*, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894), the first "fully articulated balancing test [in] American legal theory," marking "the beginning of modernism in American legal thought" and "the demise of the late-nineteenth-century system of legal formalism.").

340. On Holmes's skepticism, see Yosaf Rogat, *Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion*, 15

largely unwilling to impede regulatory innovation. And, like Holmes, he is relatively non-ideological, except that his commitment to states' rights is quite un-Holmesian, making Kennedy's jurisprudence appear much more activist than Holmes's call for judicial restraint.³⁴¹ Still, when Holmes wrote, "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience" as a critique of Christopher Columbus Langdell's jurisprudence,³⁴² he could have been describing Justice Kennedy's attitude toward Justice Scalia. Holmes's critique may very well help explain the divide between the two justices. How this divide—between Scalia's categorical distinctions and Kennedy's fact-based consequentialism³⁴³—plays out may well characterize the nature of the environmental jurisprudence that the Roberts Court has begun to create.

STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962–63).

341. *See, e.g.,* *Lochner v. New York*, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law."). On Holmes's commitment to judicial restraint and to majoritarianism, *see* G. EDWARD WHITE, *JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF* 327–30, 343, 363, 391, 487 (1993).

342. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., *THE COMMON LAW* 1 (1881). Holmes referred to Langdell, the Harvard Law School Dean and founder of the casebook method of legal instruction, as "the greatest living legal theologian." *Book Notices*, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, *A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS* (2d ed. 1880)); *see also* KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., *AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS* 339 (2d ed. 1996) (attributing the review of Langdell's casebook to Holmes).

343. Kennedy, like Justice O'Connor, might be described as a Burkean minimalist. *See* Cass R. Sunstein, *Burkean Minimalism*, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356–59 (2006) (describing Burkean minimalists as adherents to incrementalism and established traditions on pragmatic and consequentialist grounds, and including Justices O'Connor and Frankfurter among the practitioners of Burkean minimalism).

APPENDIX A:
Supreme Court Environmental Decisions 1989–2007³⁴⁴

Year	Case name	Citation	Kennedy's role
1989	Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.	491 U.S. 1	Joined in both Justice White's and Justice Scalia's partial dissents from the 5-4 decision
1989	Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation	492 U.S. 408	Joined majority
1989	Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council	490 U.S. 332	Joined unanimous majority
1989	Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council	490 U.S. 360	Joined unanimous majority
1989	Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New Mexico	490 U.S. 163	Joined majority
1989	Hallstrom v. Tillamook County	493 U.S. 20	Joined majority
1989	New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans	491 U.S. 350	Joined majority
1990	General Motors Corp. v. United States	496 U.S. 530	Joined majority
1990	California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission	495 U.S. 490	Joined unanimous majority
1990	Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife	497 U.S. 871	Joined 5-4

344. This case table includes environmental decisions issued by the Court during Kennedy's tenure. Case names which appear in boldface type indicate decisions in which Kennedy wrote an opinion. Although the overall vote count was not included for each decision, the table does note which cases which were decided with a slim five-member majority. A small number of cases included in the tabular data indicate Kennedy wrote an opinion for the case, but are not discussed in the article text. These decisions are marked with an *. We omitted these cases from the discussion either because while the decision had a significant effect on environmental law, the case itself did not involve environmental issues (*United States v. Lopez*; *City of Bourne v. Flores*), or because the decision involved an original jurisdiction state boundary dispute (*Louisiana v. Mississippi*; *Alaska v. United States*).

	Federation		majority
1991	Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier	501 U.S. 597	Joined majority
1991	Illinois v. Kentucky	500 U.S. 380	Joined unanimous majority
1991	Oklahoma v. New Mexico	501 U.S. 221	Joined parts of the majority opinion and also Chief Justice Rehnquist's partial concurrence and dissent
1992	Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt	504 U.S. 334	Joined majority
1992	Arkansas v. Oklahoma	503 U.S. 91	Joined unanimous majority
1992	United States Department of Energy v. Ohio	503 U.S. 607	Joined majority
1992	City of Burlington v. Dague	505 U.S. 557	Joined majority
1992	Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife	504 U.S. 555	Wrote opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
1992	Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society	503 U.S. 429	Joined unanimous majority
1992	Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association	505 U.S. 88	Wrote 5-4 concurrence
1992	Mississippi v. Louisiana	506 U.S. 73	Joined unanimous majority
1992	Wyoming v. Oklahoma	502 U.S. 437	Joined majority
1992	New York v. United States	505 U.S. 144	Joined majority
1992	United States v. Alaska	503 U.S. 569	Joined unanimous

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			majority
1992	Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources	504 U.S. 353	Joined majority
1992	Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission	505 U.S. 1003	Wrote concurrence
1992	Yee v. City of Escondido	503 U.S. 519	Joined majority
1993	South Dakota v. Bourland	508 U.S. 679	Joined majority
1993	Nebraska v. Wyoming	507 U.S. 584	Joined unanimous majority
1994	Key Tronic Corp. v. United States	511 U.S. 809	Joined majority
1994	C & A Carbone, Inc v. Town of Clarkstown	511 U.S. 383	Wrote 6-3 majority
1994	Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality	511 U.S. 93	Joined majority
1994	Jefferson County PUD No. 1 v. Washington Department of Ecology	511 U.S. 700	Joined majority
1994	City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense	511 U.S. 328	Joined majority
1994	Dolan v. City of Tigard	512 U.S. 374	Joined 5-4 majority
1995	United States v. Lopez*	514 U.S. 549	Concurred in 5-4 majority opinion but wrote separate concurrence
1995	Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon	515 U.S. 687	Joined majority
1995	Louisiana v. Mississippi*	516 U.S. 22	Wrote unanimous majority
1995	Kansas v. Colorado	514 U.S. 673	Joined unanimous majority

1995	Nebraska v. Wyoming	515 U.S. 1	Joined majority
1996	Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida	517 U.S. 44	Joined 5-4 majority
1996	Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.	516 U.S. 479	Joined unanimous majority
1997	Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor	521 U.S. 591	Joined majority
1997	Bennett v. Spear	520 U.S. 154	Joined unanimous majority
1997	Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho	521 U.S. 261	Wrote 5-4 majority
1997	United States v. Alaska	521 U.S. 1	Joined majority
1997	Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency	520 U.S. 725	Joined majority
1997	Babbitt v. Youpee	519 U.S. 234	Joined majority
1997	City of Boerne v. Flores*	521 U.S. 507	Wrote majority
1998	United States v. Bestfoods	524 U.S. 51	Joined unanimous majority
1998	South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe	522 U.S. 39	Joined unanimous majority
1998	Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government	522 U.S. 520	Joined unanimous majority
1998	New Jersey v. New York	523 U.S. 767	Joined majority
1998	Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment	523 U.S. 83	Joined majority and Justice O'Connor's concurrence
1998	Ohio Forestry Association Inc. v. Sierra Club	523 U.S. 726	Joined unanimous majority
1998	Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel	524 U.S. 498	Wrote opinion concurring with 4-member plurality's

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			judgment and dissented in part
1999	Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Tribe	526 U.S. 865	Wrote majority
1999	City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd.	526 U.S. 687	Wrote unanimous decision with respect to certain parts of the opinion and a 5-4 majority with respect to other parts
2000	United States v. Locke	529 U.S. 89	Wrote unanimous opinion
2000	Friends of the Earth, Inc v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.	528 U.S. 167	Wrote concurrence
2001	Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.	531 U.S. 457	Joined majority
2001	Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	531 U.S. 159	Joined 5-4 majority
2001	Idaho v. United States	533 U.S. 262	Joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent from a 5-4 decision
2001	Palazzolo v. Rhode Island	533 U.S. 606	Wrote 5-4 majority
2002	Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	537 U.S. 99	Did not take part in the 4-4 decision
2004	Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA	540 U.S. 461	Wrote dissent from 5-4 decision
2004	Engine Manufacturing Association v. South Coast Air	541 U.S. 246	Joined majority

	Quality Management District		
2004	Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.	543 U.S. 157	Joined majority
2004	South Florida Water Management v. Miccosukee Tribe	541 U.S. 95	Joined majority
2004	U.S. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen	541 U.S. 752	Joined unanimous majority
2004	Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance	542 U.S. 55	Joined unanimous majority
2004	BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States	541 U.S. 176	Joined majority
2005	Alaska v. United States*	545 U.S. 75	Wrote unanimous majority in part and majority with respect to other parts of opinion
2005	Kelo v. City of New London	545 U.S. 469	Wrote concurrence to 5-4 decision
2005	Lingle v. Chevron	544 U.S. 528	Wrote concurrence to a unanimous decision
2006	S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board Of Environmental Protection	547 U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1843	Joined majority
2006	Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	__U.S.__ (June, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006)	Wrote an opinion concurring with the 4-member plurality's judgment
2007	Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency	__U.S.__ (April, 2007), 127 S. Ct.	Joined 5-4 majority

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2007	Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.	__U.S.__ (April, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 1423	Joined majority
2007	United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.	__U.S.__ (June, 2007), 127 S. Ct. 2331	Joined unanimous majority