Microaggressions as Negligence

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Journal of Social Philosophy

Journal Abbreviation

J. Soc. Phil.

Abstract

What makes microaggressions wrong? In this article, I suggest that the wrongness of most—though not all—cases of microaggressions can be captured as instances of negligence. A case of negligence holds when, regardless of an actor's personal intentions, they wrong another in a manner that is both reasonably foreseeable and reasonably avoidable (this failing is commonly summarized as a failure to exercise “due care”).

Thinking of microaggressions as negligence answers some objections of skeptics who overwhelmingly focus on the possibility that the alleged microaggressor “meant no offense.” It does so while retaining language explaining why a wrong was committed and suggesting what sort of corrective behavior can reasonably be demanded so as to avoid these wrongs in the future. I also argue that a negligence framework is a helpful way of phenomenologically explaining many microaggressions—both why they are occurring and why they are perceived as the sort of conduct that subjects the microaggressor to agent-level moral criticism. Indeed, I believe that negligence-style logic permeates many accounts that already exist regarding why microaggression is wrong, albeit without fully being recognized. Finally, in cases where it applies, the negligence framework has an advantage over alternate accounts in that it provides for consideration of both the moral culpability of the perpetrator as well as the tangible impact of microaggressions on the victim.

First Page

282

Last Page

299

Publication Date

2025

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