Matter of Negusie and the Failure of Asylum Law to Recognize Child Soldiers

Authors

Ruth Campbell

Author Details

Ruth Campell, J.D. 2021, Lewis & Clark Law School.

First Page

997

Abstract

In Matter of Negusie, Attorney General William Barr struck yet another blow to asylum seekers by rejecting any exception for duress or coercion in applying the “persecutor bar” to immigration relief. Commentators have previously observed that the victims of the “strict-liability persecutor bar” to asylum will often be child soldiers, usually discussed in the context of children fleeing conflicts in parts of Africa and the Middle East. This Comment aims to recontextualize concern about the availability of asylum for child soldiers as part of an ongoing crisis of children fleeing recruitment by powerful gangs and cartels in Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In so doing, this Comment examines a glaring disparity in conventional understanding of who is a child soldier, questioning why children with strikingly similar experiences may be labeled “child soldiers” on one continent, but “members” of gangs or cartels on another. Part I explores the history and rhetorical power behind the term “child soldier,” situating this discussion within a broader post-colonial framework. Part II explains how children recruited by gangs and cartels fit in to the international legal definition of child soldiers. Part III reviews U.S. international legal commitments to child soldiers and the role Matter of Negusie plays in the failure to meet these commitments for children arriving at the U.S. border. Ultimately, this Comment argues that in order for the United States to fulfill its international commitments to child soldiers, it must adopt a duress defense to the persecutor bar to protect children fleeing recruitment by armed groups in Mexico and Central America.

Recommended Citation

Ruth Campbell, Matter of Negusie and the Failure of Asylum Law to Recognize Child Soldiers, 25 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 997 (2021).
Available at: https://lawcommons.lclark.edu/lclr/vol25/iss3/8